China's county-level intergovernmental transfer system: an empirical study. by Li, Ching Man. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
China's County-level Intergovernmental Transfer System: 
An Empirical Study 
LI, Ching Man 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
in 
Economics 
• T h e Chinese University of Hong Kong 
August 2007 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any 
person(s) intending to use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a 
proposed publication must seek copyright release from the Dean of the 
Graduate School 
SEP M i 
~university~/^Jf 
N^ JSM-ICRARY SYSTEM/>^ 
Abstract 
While there are many studies focusing on the central-provincial system of 
intergovernmental transfers in China, the subprovincial system has only 
attracted more attention in recent years. To further our understanding of 
subprovincial public finance, this thesis attempts to examine the county-level 
intergovernmental transfer system. In particular, this thesis looks into the 
factors determining the allocation of different categories of transfers. 
Previous studies criticize that the allocation of transfers to county-level 
jurisdictions in China is not based on the equalization of local needs. 
Furthermore, the allocation mechanism is often distorted by considerations 
such as employment creation to avoid social unrest and defusing local fiscal 
crises to maintain political stability. In this connection, we investigate 
empirically the determinants behind the spatial allocation of transfers with 
respect to county-level governments using a panel dataset of 1865 
counties/county-level cities for the period 1999-2003. We attempt to find out 
to what extent the current county-level intergovernmental transfer system is 
shaped by political considerations as opposed to such objectives as the 
equalization of public services and equity. The results indicate that the size of 
public employment as a proxy for politics is an important determinant in the 
allocation of county-level intergovernmental transfers for the western region. 
These findings shed light on the on-going discussions on the design of China's 
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Under a multi-tier system of governments, different levels of 
governments often assume different responsibilities. Due to the different 
ability in generating fiscal resources among local governments, an 
intergovernmental transfer system is needed to correct vertical imbalances and 
address such issues as the equalization of public services and regional 
disparities (Shah, 1994). A well-designed intergovernmental transfer system is 
also supposed to provide the right incentives for both the central government 
and local governments to avoid such problems as soft budget constraints (Bahl, 
2001; Bird and Smart, 2002; Boadway and Hobson, 1993; Oates, 2005). With 
a five-tier hierarchical system of governments in China, how to design an 
intergovernmental transfer system to ensure equitable provision of public 
goods such as education and health care is extremely complicated and is a 
hotly debated issue in China. While previous studies often focus on the 
central-provincial fiscal system,! the subject of subprovincial transfers has 
1 See for example, Bahl (1998，2001); Du (2001); Liang and Ye (1999); OECD (2006); 
Oksenberg and Tong (1991); Wang (2005); Wong (1997); Wong (2006); World Bank (2002); 
Zhao and Zhang (1999)，the list is by no means exhaustive. 
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rs 
only recently attracted more attention. This thesis attempts to contribute to 
this subject by examining the county-level intergovernmental transfer system. 
Does the current design of China's county-level intergovernmental transfer 
system conform to such principles as the equalization of public services based 
on such local needs as education and health care? To what extent is the 
allocation shaped by political factors? In short, we look into the determinants 
behind the spatial allocation of transfers. 
In the Chinese context, transfers are filtered down a five-tier 
administrative hierarchy. It is often argued that expedients to maintain 
political stability and harmony rather then well-designed schemes to equalize 
local needs play a critical role in shaping the spatial allocation of transfers 
flowing down the administrative hierarchy (Wong, 2006). For instance, the 
central government has introduced transfers to address the problem of wage 
arrears so as to avoid political instability. Some critics argue that such transfers 
render downsizing of the fiscally supported population (caizheng gongyang 
renkou) all the more difficult (Wong, 2006). ^ Moreover, such transfers are 
2 The exceptions are Huang (1999); Shah and Shen (2006); Shih, Liu and Zhang (2004); Tsui 
(2005). 
3 Fiscally supported population includes state employees (guojia zhigong), collective 
employees (Jiti zhigong), legislators in the local People's Congress, members of the 
“democratic parties", retired cadres, teachers and decommissioned military officers. 
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not based on equity principle and are not redistributive (Yep, 2004). This 
thesis explores empirically whether these perceptions about China's system of 
transfers indeed approximate Chinese reality. 
Using a panel dataset of 1865 counties/county-level cities for the period 
1999-2003, we attempt to find out the extent to which the current county-level 
intergovernmental transfer system is shaped by ad hoc political considerations 
as opposed to whether the current system is equalizing, ensuring that poorly 
endowed county-level governments receive more transfers.^ 
1.2 Contribution 
This thesis is an attempt to extend the research of China's subprovincial 
intergovernmental transfer system in several directions. One contribution is 
the use of a new panel dataset of county-level data. Departing from many 
previous studies based on anecdotes and case studies, we employ regression 
analysis to find out the factors shaping the allocation of various categories of 
transfers. The determinants can be grouped into those related to politics as 
opposed to those linked to the equalization of public services and regional 
4 The data used in this thesis mainly comes from 1999-2003 Nian Quanguo Dishixian 
Caizheng Tongji Ziliao (Sub-Provincial Public Finance Statistics, 1999-2003), published by 
the Ministry of Finance. This dataset includes a wide range of fiscal information, namely 
fiscally supported population and various transfers received from upper-level governments for 
counties, county-level-cities and urban districts. 
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disparities. In this connection, we use the size of public employment and local 
fiscal deficit as proxies for political factors impinging on the 
intergovernmental transfer system. To explore whether the current system is 
egalitarian ensuring that poor county-level governments receive more transfers, 
other factors such as GDP per capita is included. The empirical analysis sheds 
light how these two forces shape the current county-level intergovernmental 
transfer system. 
Table 1.1 China provinces and regions 
Eastern Region Central Region Western Region 
Beijing Anhui Chongqing 
Fujian Heilongjiang Gansu 
Guangdong Henan Guangxi 
Hainan Hubei Guizhou 
Hebei Hunan Inner Mongolia 
Jiangsu Jiangxi Ningxia 
Liaoning Jilin Qinghai 





Source: Shah and Shen (2006) 
As large regional disparities exist in China, the role of political 
considerations as opposed to other concerns in shaping the allocation of 
transfers may vary for different (see Table 1.1). Specifically, it is common to 
partition China into the eastern, central and western regions with the central 
4 
and western regions being less-developed. In particular, the western region 
consists of twelve relatively poor provinces and the ratio of ethnic minorities 
to total population is high in such provinces as Yunnan and Xinjiang. To 
appease these ethnic minorities and perhaps suppress secessionist tendencies, 
the central government often promulgates policies in favour of the western 
region, an example being the go-west campaign (xibu da kaifa).^ In so far as 
the eastern region mainly consists of very developed provinces such as 
Guangdong and Fujian (see Table 1.1), political considerations may have 
played a lesser role in the transfer systems of the eastern region as compared 
with the western and central region, which are comparatively underdeveloped 
and are more susceptible to social unrests. Our empirical work attempts to 
capture empirically, using regression analysis, such differences induced by 
China's spatial diversities. 
This thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter explores the 
background of China's county-level fiscal and administrative system and the 
changing structure of the intergovernmental transfer system with special 
emphasis on their link with the fiscally supported population. Chapter three 
5 The central government introduced the go-west campaign in 2000, which aims at boosting 
the underdeveloped western region (Goodman, 2004). 
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reviews the existing literature. Chapter four discusses model specifications, 
data and estimation strategies. Chapter five presents the estimation results in 




This thesis attempts to examine the extent to which the current 
county-level intergovernmental transfer system is shaped by such factors as 
politics and equalization of public services, and pressure to reduce regional 
disparities. As a prelude to our subsequent empirical analysis, we begin with 
an overview of China's county-level fiscal and administrative system. We then 
describe briefly the changing structure of the intergovernmental transfer 
system and its implications. In the last section, we discuss the two forces, 
namely, egalitarian and political considerations shaping the current 
county-level intergovernmental transfer system. 
2.1 China's County-level Fiscal & Administrative System 
Before discussing the factors governing the current county-level 
intergovernmental transfer system, it is important to have an overview of 
China's county-level fiscal and administrative system. China has a multi-tier 
system of government. Its formal administrative system is made up of five 
tiers, namely, the central government, provinces, prefectures, counties, and 
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townships (Wong, Heady and Woo, 1995). ^ There are often mismatches 
between expenditure responsibilities and revenue raising power of local 
governments. Thus, an intergovernmental transfer system is needed to fill such 
fiscal gaps (Shah, 1994; World Bank, 2002). Under the current administrative 
hierarchy, the central government only allocates transfers to provincial 
governments. In general, prefectures, counties and townships do not get any 
direct transfers from the central government. Each level of governments in 
turn allocates the transfers to their subordinate governments (Shah and Shen, 
2006)7 
There are potential distortions when transfers are filtering down the 
five-tier hierarchy (Peng, 2006). Such distortions can best be summarized by 
what Li Jinhua, the Auditor General of the National Audit Office of the 
People's Republic of China, has said regarding the Audit Findings on the 
Implementation of Fiscal 2004 Budgets. He points out that central transfers 
filtering down different tiers of governments are just like water passing 
6 Currently, the second tier consists of 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, and four 
municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing). The third tier consists of 331 
prefectures. The fourth tier consists of 2,109 counties/cities. The fifth tier consists of 44,741 
villages/townships. Below townships, villages belong to informal level of the administrative 
hierarchy, 
7 Shah (2006) points out that some county-level governments obtain transfers directly from 
provincial-level governments instead of prefecture-level governments. Such counties can be 
found in (1) seven provinces, including Anhui, Fujian, Heilongjiang, Hainan, Hubei, 
Ningxia, and Zhejiang; (2) four directly administered cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, and Chongqing and (3) five separately planned cities, including Dalian, Qingdao, 
Shenzhen , Xiamen and Ningbo 
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through a very long leaking pipeline. By the time transfers reach grassroots 
governments, it is not inconceivable that the amount of transfers is greatly 
reduced. For instance, some provinces hold back part of the transfers from 
subprovincial governments for their own purposes (Cui and Ni, 2003; Lei, 
2006; OECD, 2006; Song, Shao and Lu, 2006; Zhong, 2006). 
As an example, and relevant to this thesis is the prefecture-level which 
lies between the provinces and counties. Prefecture-level governments 
structure their intergovernmental transfer systems in conjunction with their 
subordinate counties. These systems are often not the same as those higher up 
the administrative hierarchy. There are allegations that prefecture-level cities 
often exploit county-level governments in terms of fiscal resources, thereby 
aggravating vertical imbalances (See, e.g. Chung and Lam, 2004; Dai, 2001). 
In so far as the central-provincial transfer system is not strictly followed 
at the subprovincial level, the factors behind the allocation of transfers at the 
county-level may not be the same as those at the provincial level (Jia, 2005). 
Much therefore remains to be done understanding the determinants shaping 
the spatial allocation of various categories of transfers at the county level. 
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2.2 Changing Structure of the Intergovernmental Transfer System 
An intergovernmental transfer system should in principle be transparent, 
equitable and provide the right incentives for local governments. Furthermore, 
o 
the allocation of transfers should ideally be based on local needs. However, 
in the Chinese context, some critics argue that the design of transfers is in 
general not need-based or formula-based (OECD, 2006). The central 
government often relies heavily on transfers to avert subprovincial fiscal crises 
(Wong, 2006)，with the perverse incentives of aggravating such problems as 
local deficits, wage arrears and failure to provide basic local public goods 
(Shah, 2006; but see Shih, Liu and Zhang, 2004). To provide a background for 
understanding these allegations and also have a preliminary idea of the 
possible factors driving the spatial allocation of various categories of transfers 
at the county level, thereby paving the way for the subsequent empirical 
analysis, it is useful to first review the different categories of transfers. 
8 For details, see Shah (2006). 
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Table 2.1 Changing categories of transfers 
Before the 1994 tax sharing After the 1994 tax s h a r i n g R e c e n t years (1999-2002) 
system system 
Earmarked transfers Tax rebates Wage adjustment transfers 
Original-system transfers Transitional Minority regions transfers 
intergovernmental transfers Transfers for teachers' 
salaries 
Rural tax reform transfers 
As summarized in Table 2.1, the structure of the intergovernmental 
transfer system has changed substantially in recent years since the introduction 
of the tax sharing system (fenshuizhi) in 1994. Before 1994, there were two 
main categories of transfers, including earmarked transfers and 
original-system transfers. The tax sharing system ushered in two categories of 
transfers: tax rebates and transitional intergovernmental transfers. In recent 
years, the central government further introduced a whole host of subsidies 
including, inter alia, wage adjustment transfers, rural tax reform transfers, 
minority regions transfers in many cases. We review each of those transfers in 
turn. 
Notwithstanding the many new transfers introduced after 1994， 
earmarked transfers (zhuanxiang buzhu) are still a very important component 
in the transfer system. Figure 2.2 shows that the percentage of earmarked 
transfers was about 13% in 1995 and then increased to 17% in 1999 but then 
dropped to 12% in 2003. On the whole, earmarked transfers have declined in 
11 
recent years. Earmarked transfers are designed basically to direct fiscal 
resources to jurisdictions for purposes ranging from capital constructions to 
social relief for calamities. Currently, there are about 200 ad hoc earmarked 
transfers, the allocation of which is on a project-by-project basis with 
upper-level governments having much discretion in their allocation (Zhou, 
2006; Du, 2001). Local governments in turn have incentives to lobby for more 
earmark transfers (Cui and Ni, 2003; Liu and Tao, 2004). The end result is that 
jurisdictions with stronger ability to lobby often receive more earmarked 
transfers, implying that earmarked transfers may not reach those jurisdictions 
with the greatest needs. Not only is the allocation of earmarked transfers 
discretionary, local governments also have considerable discretion over the 
specific usage of the funds allocated. For instance, such funds may be 
diverted to pay for increases in pension benefits (Ahmad, Singh and Fortuna, 
2004). 
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Co-existing with the earmarked transfers throughout the 1990s are 
original-system transfers. Original-system transfers are the negotiated transfers 
agreed before the 1994 reform that remain effective under the new system 
(Wang, 2005). With the amount frozen at the 1993 level, their importance has 
decreased in recent years (see Figure 2.2). For some provinces such as 
Guangdong and Henan, this category of transfers has been phasing out at the 
county level (Tsui, 2005). Thus, we will not focus on original-system transfers 
in this thesis. 
After the introduction of the tax sharing system in 1994, the central 
government introduced two key transfers, namely, tax rebates and transitional 
intergovernmental transfers, to appease local governments. Tax rebate, a key 
element in the 1994 tax sharing system, is the amount of value-added tax and 
consumption tax that the central government returns to the provinces 
according to a formula laid down by the 1994 reform (Song, 2006; Wang, 
2002). Tax rebate protects the vested interests of provincial governments by 
ensuring that their revenues would not fall below the amounts in 1993 (Cui 
and Ni, 2003; Tsui, 2005; Wang, 2002; Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003; 
Zhu, 2006). As the original intention is to appease affluent local governments, 
14 
the primary beneficiaries of this system are wealthy instead of poor 
underdeveloped jurisdictions. Though tax rebates at the provincial level are 
calculated based on formulae, whether subprovincial governments strictly 
adhere to this practice is not all that clear. 
Figure 2.2 shows that, though the percentage of tax rebates has a 
downward trend in recent years, it still accounts for about 13% of total 
transfers in 2003. The predominance of tax rebates continues to hinder the 
system's ability to reduce horizontal fiscal disparities across regions. 
Another key element of the 1994 reform is the introduction of the 
transitional intergovernmental transfer scheme {guoduqi caizheng zhuanyi 
zhifu) (Caizhengbu yusuansi, 1999a; Kou and Wang, 2003; Tsui, 2005) to lure 
less developed provinces into accepting the tax sharing system. It has been 
renamed as general-purpose transfers since 2002. The transitional 
intergovernmental transfer scheme was an important breakthrough in the 
history of the Chinese fiscal system. It was the first formula-based transfer in 
China (Caizhengbu yusuansi, 1999a; Dang, 2000; Zhang and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2003). ^ This system incorporates objective criteria in 
9 Details of how of the transitional intergovernmental transfers are calculated can be found in 
Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003). 
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determing the allocation of transfers among provinces. Initially, the system 
was set up between the central government and the provinces. Gradually, 
subprovincial governments followed suit. But they have the discretion to 
design their own formula-based systems with subordinate governments 
(Caizhengbu yusuansi, 1999a). 
Figure 2.2 shows that the percentage of transitional intergovernmental 
transfers has increased drastically in recent years. However, the amounts are 
still very small, averaging about 3.5% of total transfers in all years, despite an 
increasing trend in recent years. 
Since the end of the 1990s, the central government has introduced new 
categories of transfers apparently to address various crises potentially 
undermining stability. Among them is the subprovincial fiscal crisis which has 
long been a problem for local governments because they have to shoulder 
increasing responsibilities while fiscal resources are shifted upwards.� As 
pointed out by Liu and Tao (2004), provincial governments have tried to 
extract larger shares of revenues from lower-level governments while 
Jia (2005) argues that counties bear huge fiscal burdens because there is actually no tax 
sharing system at subprovincial governments. Krug, Zhu and Hendrischke (2004) also 
mention that each tier of the administrative hierarchy attempt to maximize revenue while 
shifting expenditure responsibilities for public services downwards. 
16 
assigning ever more expenditure responsibilities to them. Faced with huge 
fiscal burdens, local governments sometimes do not have enough funds to pay 
wages of public employees. For instance, Yep (2004) points out that local 
governments in Anhui "still could not afford wage payments for teachers on 
time even with a full financial backing from higher levels." 
In recent years, local governments increasingly rely on wage adjustment 
transfers to alleviate wage burdens. The wage adjustment transfer was 
introduced in 1999 initially as a measure to stimulate aggregate demand after 
the Asian Financial Crisis (Hu, Zhang and Zhou, 2000; Ministry of Finance, 
1999). 11 Wage adjustment transfers have since become annual subsidies by 
the central government to share the burden due to wage increases for local 
government employees in order to wage arrears. Figure 2.2 shows that the 
percentage of wage adjustment transfers to total transfers has increased from 
about 3% in 2000 to about 8% in 2003. As shown in Figure 2.2, wage 
adjustment transfer payments have made up an increasing portion of central 
transfers, thereby squeezing out such need-based subsidies. 
The central government decided to increase wages on July 1，1999 by RMB 120 per capita 
to stimulate aggregate demand after the Asian Financial Crisis (Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez; 
2003). Wage adjustment transfers are then introduced according to the "Circular on the 
allocation of transfers for wage and subsidies increase of public employees 1999" (1999 nian 
zengjia jiguan shiye danwei zaizhi zhigong gongzi he lituixiu renyuan li tuixiu fei zhongyang 
dui difang zhuanyi zhifu banfa). 
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Apart from wage adjustment transfers, there are also other newly 
introduced transfers, such as rural tax reform transfers, minority regions 
transfers and teachers' salaries transfers. The background to the rural tax 
reform transfers is the tax-for-fee reform (feigaishui). As local governments do 
not have enough fiscal resources for the provision of public services, like 
education and health services after spending a large portion on paying wages 
and subsidies (Liu and Tao, 2004), they therefore have to rely on imposing 
surcharges on peasants, an example being higher education charges, resulting 
in heavy peasant burdens (Bernstein and Lu, 2003; Yep, 2004). For instance, 
Li (2002) mentions that the poorest 20% of rural households have to pay 50% 
of overall taxes collected in rural areas by the late 1990s. Moreover, their tax 
burdens account for about 20% of their net income. To alleviate the excessive 
financial burden of rural peasants, the central government introduced the 
tax-for-fee reform in recent years. ^ ^ Under this tax-for-fee reform, all rural 
fees are abolished (Yep, 2004). Rural tax reform transfers are then introduced 
in 2002 to make up for the resulting revenue shortfalls. ^ ^ 
12 The tax-for-fee reform was first implemented in Anhui in 2000. Then it gradually extended 
to 20 other provinces in 2002 (Kennedy, 2007). 
13 Rural tax reform transfers are allocated according to the "Circular on the allocation of 
tax-for-fee reform transfer "s (Nongcun shuifei gaige zhongyang dui difang zhuanyi zhifu 
zanxing banfa) (Ministry of Finance, 2002). 
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Minority regions transfers are introduced in 2000 to support economic 
development in minority regions." Transfers for teachers' salaries are 
introduced in 2001 to subsidize teachers' salaries” All these new categories 
of transfers are introduced by the central government to defuse local fiscal 
crisis, bail out local government and appease minorities in order to ensure 
political stability. 16 
On the whole, the changing structure of the intergovernmental transfer 
system in recent years has important implications. The relative importance of 
earmarked grants and tax rebates has declined in recent years. Their 
importance has been gradually replaced by other categories of transfers, which 
basically aim at averting subprovincial fiscal crises and maintaining political 
stability. The changing structure also suggests that factors shaping the 
allocation of transfers may be linked to the defiision of local fiscal crises in 
order to maintain political stability. This motivates the empirical analysis of 
14 The allocation of minority regions transfers is based on the "Circular on the 
implementation of minority region transfers 2000" (Caizhengbu guanwu xia da 2000 nian 
xinzeng minzu diqu zhuanyi zhifu zijin de tongzhi) (Ministry of Finance, 2000). 
15 To ensure that public employees including teachers can get timely and sufficient amount of 
wages, the General Office of the State Council introduced the "Circular of the General Office 
“ of the State Council on assurance of timely and sufficient wages for public employees" 
(Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting guowuyuan bangongting guanwu quebao jiguan shiye 
danwei zhigong gongzi anshi zue fafang de tongzhi) in 2001. 
16 As the data for these new categories of transfers is only available starting from 2001 
onwards, we will exclude these in our subsequent empirical analysis. 
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this thesis to explore whether such factors as the size of the local bureaucracy 
and local fiscal deficits may be shaping the current county-level 
intergovernmental transfer system. 
2.3 Forces Shaping the Current Intergovernmental Transfer System 
Our review of the different categories of transfers suggests a number of 
factors ranging from politics to the equalization of public services and 
concerns for regional equity driving the allocation of transfers. This section 
takes a closer look at the forces behind the changing configuration of the 
transfer system. To what extent is the current system of transfers equalizing? If 
the objective of the current system is to address regional disparities so as to 
ensure an equalization of public services, then the allocation of transfers 
would exhibit a high degree of progressivity, i.e. poorer jurisdictions receive 
more transfers. We expect that transfers would be allocated according to (1) 
the level of development of a jurisdiction as reflected by real gross domestic 
product per capita and economic structure; (2) local needs as reflected by such 
indictors as illiteracy rate, infant mortality rate, life expectancy, etc. 
Government agencies and the official media have tried to conjure up the image 
that the transfer system is increasingly equalizing. Ministry of Finance (2007) 
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has repeatedly emphasized that the size of the general-purpose transfer has 
been growing at a fast rate, projecting to reach $1527 billion in 2007, 72 times 
larger than that of 1995. Moreover, Kou (2007) points out that the size of 
general-purpose transfers allocated to the poorer central and western regions 
increased by about $407 billion in 2007 when comparing with that in 2005. 
According to the Chinese Central Television (2007)，the number of nationally 
designated poverty counties has decreased from 791 in 2004 to 200 in 2006 
not least because of central subsidies to alleviate the subprovincial fiscal 
burdens. However, many critics argue that the opposite is true and the current 
system is not equalizing (Lei, 2006; Song, Shao and Lu, 2006; World Bank, 
2002; Wong, 2006). Furthermore, some critics contend that the current 
transfer system does not ensure an equitable provision of public services 
across jurisdictions (Ahmad, Singh and Fortuna; 2004, Li, 2004). 
If the current system is not equalizing, then we expect that the system 
may be shaped by other factors such as political considerations. The central 
government, fearing political instability, has introduced various categories of 
transfers to bail out local governments in trouble. Critical to political stability 
are the huge fiscally supported population and local fiscal deficits, which may 
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influence how the transfers are spatially allocated. As a prelude to our 
subsequent empirical analysis on the factors driving the spatial distribution of 
transfers, it is therefore useful to review the issue of the huge fiscally 
supported population and local fiscal deficits. 
The term fiscally supported population {caizheng gongyang renkou) 
refers to those supported by the budget. They include state employees {guojia 
zhigong), collective employees (Jiti zhigong), legislators in the local People's 
Congress, members of the "democratic parties", retired cadres, teachers and 
decommissioned military officers. Figure 2.3 shows the fiscally supported 
population per capita in the county-level governments for the eastern, central 
and western regions in China. In recent years, fiscally supported population 
per capita exhibits an increasing trend in all the three regions, despite repeated 
attempts to downsize the government (Bums, 2003). 
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Figure 2.3 Average fiscally supported population per capita at the county level for the 
eastern, central and western regions in China 
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To ensure political stability, the central government does not want to have 
widespread unemployment. Due to limited working opportunities in poor 
regions, people covet positions in local governments. 口 Moreover, in the mid 
1990s, the large-scale restructuring of state-owned enterprises led to a large 
number of workers being laid off. To avoid massive unemployment, local 
governments have the incentive to be the employer of the last resort (Liang, 
2004). These local governments usually employ more people than the number 
17 Liang (2004) explains that people covet for positions in the government because cadres 
seldom get fired and thus have a stable career. Liu and Tao (2004) argue that working for the 
government is the best job opportunity in less developed regions. 
23 
1 fi 
of officially approved positions (bianzhi). Local governments also have to 
provide jobs for decommissioned soldiers (Bums, 2003; Li, 2003). Besides, 
local cadres are also prone to offering job opportunities for their relatives and 
friends, another reason for government overstaffing (Liu and Tao, 2004). 
Overstaffing is also a result of China's five-tier administrative hierarchy 
because local governments have to establish specific departments to match 
those at upper-level governments.丨9 Overstaffing is particular serious at the 
county level (Zhang, 2003). Sometimes, there may be more than one 
department at lower-level governments to match the department at upper-level 
governments (Liang, 2004). Besides, local governments set up new offices in 
response to the tasks assigned by upper-level governments. These temporary 
offices often become permanent and employ extra staff (Liu and Tao, 2004). 
Faced with such a huge fiscally supported population, the central 
government actually has tried to address this problem in the 1990s through 
several downsizing campaigns. However, as described by Bums (2003), these 
18 See, for example, Li (2003). The State Commission on Public Sector Reform {Zhingyang 
Jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui) uses a set of criteria, for instance, total population, total 
non-agricultural population, land area, urban land area, number of administrative districts, the 
local budget income and the total value of output to determine the appropriate positions for 
each jurisdiction (Bums, 2003). 
19 For instance, in Hunan, Lu (1997) points out that there were about 20 government 
departments at the county level in 1984. However, the number of government departments 
increased to about 50-60 by the 1990s.These newly created county-level government 
departments always require the establishment of the corresponding government departments at 
the township level. 
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attempts have not been very successfully. Fearing political instability, the 
Chinese Communist Party has the incentive to create employment for the 
purpose of political patronage, thereby hampering the campaign to downsize 
the local bureaucracy. 
The bloated bureaucracy is just one facet of the local fiscal plight 
attributable often to the tax sharing system. With higher-level governments 
retaining more revenues but shifting expenditure responsibilities downwards, 
the end result is a widespread local fiscal crisis in the making (Jia and Bai, 
2002a; 2002; Li, 2004; Krug, Zhu and Hendrischke, 2004; Yao and Yang, 
2003; Zhong, 2006). One symptom of such a crisis is the failure to pay public 
employees such as teachers on time, resulting in wage arrears as well as local 
11 
governments falling into debt traps (Li, 2004; Liu and Tao, 2004). In 
response, new categories of transfers were introduced partly to avert local 
fiscal crisis. ^^  
Our discussion so far seems to suggest that the design of transfers in 
China is not quite related to local needs. If political stability is an important 
20 See Bums (2003) for a detailed description of the government re-organization campaigns. 
21 In some cases, wages have been delayed for a year or more (Chen, 2003a). 
22 Lower-level governments in the central and western regions have to rely on transfers from 
upper-level governments in order to pay wages and subsidies of the fiscally supported 
population (Zhou, 2006). In some regions, 80% of fiscal revenues are used to pay wages for 
the fiscally supported population. 
25 
consideration in China, then the allocation of transfers may likely depend on 
the fiscally supported population and local fiscal deficits which are symptoms 
of an emerging local fiscal crisis potentially upsetting political stability. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we discuss different forces ranging from equalization of 
public services to the pressure to maintain political stability, driving the 
current intergovernmental transfer system. The discussion sets the stage for 
our empirical analysis of the factors driving the allocation of transfers. 
Specifically, distilling from the discussion in the previous sections is a set of 
factors, e.g. the level of development of a jurisdiction (with, say, GDP per 
capita and economic structure as proxies), local needs (with, say, illiteracy rate, 
infant mortality rate and life expectancy as proxies) and politics (with, say, the 
fiscally supported population and local fiscal deficit as proxies) that may 
influence the spatial distributions of transfers. The above discussion suggests 




This chapter reviews the literature on the political economy driving the 
intergovernmental transfer system in so far as it is relevant to the theme of this 
thesis. There is by now a small but growing literature on China's subprovincial 
fiscal transfer system. 
3.1 Literature on the Theories of Intergovernmental Transfers Relevant to 
China 
There are two strands of the general literature on intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers that are worth reviewing because they are relevant to our discussion 
of the factors shaping the allocation of transfers. We first discuss the first 
strand which is often referred to as the "first-generation theory of fiscal 
federalism" and its normative implications (Oates, 2005; Qian and Weingast, 
1997). Then, we take a closer look at the new insights derived from the second 
strand on the role of politics in a system of transfers often referred as 
"second-generation theory fiscal federalism" (Oates, 2005; Qian and Weingast, 
1997). Reviewing the literature help us identify a set of factors that may shape 
the allocation of transfers. 
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The first-generation theory of fiscal federalism concerns how a system of 
transfers should be designed. Under this traditional view, there are two main 
justifications for intergovernmental transfers, namely, bridging the vertical 
fiscal gap and equalization of public services (Bahl, 2001). First, owing to 
mismatches between expenditure responsibilities and revenue raising power, 
intergovernmental transfers are needed to fill this fiscal gap (Bahl, 2001; Bird 
and Smart, 2002; Boadway and Hobson, 1993). Second, due to regional 
disparities, intergovernmental transfers are needed to help poor jurisdictions 
provide public goods (Inman, 1988). Theoretically, the transfer system should 
be transparent, equitable and provide the right incentives for local 
governments (Bird and Smart, 2002; Shah, 2006). 
Equipped with these objectives, how the transfers are going to be 
allocated is an important issue. Bird and Smart (2002) identifies three general 
methods of allocation, namely, (1) revenue-sharing based on fixed proportions; 
(2) ad hoc allocation; (3) formula-based allocation. They argue that the first 
method is not desirable because local governments will have fewer incentives 
to exert tax effort in so far the taxes they collect are going to be shared with 
the central government (Bird and Smart, 2002; Shah, 2006). Examples of such 
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practice can be found in various countries like Austria, China and Russia, 
etc.23 
With regard to the second method, Bahl (2001) criticizes that such 
practice is not transparent and it provides incentives for the central 
government to manipulate the allocation of transfers. Moreover, this provides 
fewer incentives for local governments to be accountable to their voters. The 
current design of intergovernmental transfer system in China relies heavily on 
ad hoc discretionary basis to allocate transfers. 
The third method is considered to be the most transparent because there 
are formulas governing how the transfers are going to be allocated. 
Formula-based transfers are allocated based on some objective and 
quantitative criteria (Bahl, 2001). For instance, many countries incorporate 
measurable indicators, including population, population density, percentage of 
school age children, percentage of households below poverty line, percentage 
of households with access to adequate water supply, etc (Bahl, 2001). Linking 
objective criteria in determining the allocation of transfers, formula-based 
,, 23 The central government in Austria allocates about 12% of income and value-added tax to 
local governments (Bird and Smart, 2002). On the other hand, the central government in 
China and Russia allocates about 25% of value-added tax to subnational governments (Bahl, 
2001). 
24 Kraemer (1997) argues that the binding rules governing the formula-based transfers can 
substantially minimize the chance of political intervention. 
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transfers take into account local needs. Many developed countries, including 
Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and Germany, follow this method (Shah, 
2006). 
Based on the above discussions, the first-generation theory of fiscal 
federalism envisions a major role for the central government to use 
intergovernmental transfers to correct vertical imbalance and address such 
issues as the equalization of public services and regional disparities (Shah, 
1994). The normative implication of this literature is that there is a set of 
factors including income level and local needs that should govern how the 
transfers are allocated among local governments. 
Ideally, the government would allocate intergovernmental transfers based 
on these factors. In the real world, other less justifiable criteria are often used 
(Bahl, 2001). The central government may use intergovernmental transfers to 
cover local fiscal deficits, to enhance re-election chances or to pay the public 
employment, thereby maintaining political stability. Such motives behind the 
allocation of transfers prompt researchers to switch from the traditional 
„ normative approach to studying the design of the transfer system to the recent 
positive approach often referred to as second-generation theory fiscal 
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federalism incorporating political factors into the analysis of the fiscal system 
(Gates, 2005). 
In analyzing the political economy of the intergovernmental transfer 
system, researchers have paid much attention to the possible political factors 
shaping the system. To maintain political support and stability are among these 
political factors. It is not surprising that local governments often rely on 
bailouts and transfers from above to cover their fiscal deficits (Rodden, 
Eskeland and Litvack, 2003). The end result for these specific deficit bailouts 
and transfers is that the governments' budget constraint is softened (Inman, 
2001; Rodden, 2002; Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack, 2003). 
There is by now a large empirical literature exploring the effects of 
political institutions on the intergovernmental transfer system. For democratic 
countries, the intergovernmental transfer system may be framed by the 
political incentives induced by the electoral competition, i.e. politicians 
allocate fiscal resources for the sake of enhancing their re-election chances 
(Alverez and Saving, 1997; Dixit and Londregan 1998; Grossman, 1994). 
, Researchers use proxies to capture how political representation systems 
impinge on the allocation of transfers. For instance, Rao and Singh (2001) use 
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the share of different states' parliamentary representation in the ruling party or 
ruling coalition as the political factor behind the spatial allocation of transfers 
in India. In another paper, Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) use the political 
representation of jurisdictions at the Congress to study the political economy 
of the transfer system in Argentina. Grossman (1994) uses the percentage of 
seats held by the Democrats in the House of Representatives as one of the 
c 
political variables behind the spatial allocation of transfers in the USA. All 
these studies find out that there is a positive relationship between political 
representation and the allocation of transfers. 
For newly democratizing countries, instead of using political 
representation to proxy for political effects on the spatial allocation of 
transfers, Neto, Marconi and Palombo (2004) use wage differential between 
the public and private sector in Brazil as proxy. They argue that due to the lack 
of monitoring system, local governments in Brazil use transfers to increase 
wages for the bureaucracy rather than achieving the goal of equalization of 
public goods. Their findings support that transfers are allocated for wage 
increases of the bureaucracy. 
25 The House of Representatives majority was Democrat in Grossman's (1994) sample period. 
32 
Public employment may also be used as a proxy in both democratic 
countries and newly democratizing countries. For instance, Grossman 
regresses total real federal grants per capita on state and local government 
employment per capita. He finds out that the size of a state's bureaucracy 
appears to be a primary factor behind the spatial allocation of grants in the 
USA. On the other hand, Gimpelson, Treisman and Monusova (2000) try to 
predict transfers and loans with lagged public employment in Russia. They 
find out that higher public employment helps to predict bigger increase in 
transfers and loans in the sample period. 
The above discussions provide us with a basic understanding of the 
theories of intergovernmental transfers. Specifically, the first-generation 
theory of fiscal federalism advocates using a set of desirable factors such as 
income and local needs based on which transfers should be allocated. 
However, the allocation of transfers in the real world rarely follows the advice 
of this normative literature. Indeed, many critics argue that China's current 
system of transfers is neither need-based nor formula-based. Motivated by the 
second-generation theory of fiscal federalism, it is interesting to adopt a 
positive approach to studying China's current intergovernmental transfer. As 
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discussed above, emerging insights derived from this new approach about the 
role of politics in the intergovernmental transfer system are relevant to this 
thesis in so far as they provide us with a theoretical framework to investigate 
how the political institution affects the allocation of transfers in China. While 
the relevant empirical literature reviewed above is often about countries with 
an electoral system, the same is not true for China. Other proxies for those 
political factors impinging on the intergovernmental transfer system have to be 
used. As we shall discuss below, among the candidates are fiscally supported 
population and local fiscal deficits. 
3. 2 Literature on China's Intergovernmental Transfer System 
With the above literature as a background, we review recent works on 
China's intergovernmental transfer system. As discussed in section 3.1，the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers should ideally be driven by 
objectives such as correcting vertical imbalances and addressing such issues as 
equalization of public services and regional disparities among local 
governments. Yet, in the case of China, many critics argue that the current 
system fails to conform to these ideal principles. Instead, politics seem to be 
the driving force behind the current system. In this section, we first discuss the 
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problems with the current system. We then review the empirical studies on 
China's intergovernmental transfer system. 
After the introduction of the tax sharing system in 1994，there is a general 
impression in the existing literature that the huge vertical imbalance created 
has not yet been addressed through sufficient amounts of transitional 
intergovernmental transfers (Cui and Ni, 2003; Fang, 2006; Lei, 2006; Liu and 
Tao, 2004; Song, 2006; Song, Shao and Lu, 2006). The volume of earmarked 
transfers has significantly increased. Their allocation tends to be ad hoc and is 
not equalizing (World Bank, 2002). Though earmarked transfers can alleviate 
specific short-term problems, they may undermine the aim of greater 
transparency in intergovernmental fiscal relations (Ahmad, Singh and Fortuna, 
2004; Song, 2006). 
Much criticized by fiscal expert is the tax rebate which favours rich 
jurisdictions but not poor jurisdictions (Fang, 2006; Li, 2004; Zhong, 2006). 
Bahl and Wallich (1992) argue that tax rebates actually try to maintain a 
historical and benchmark level of expenditures for rich jurisdictions. Wong 
(2006) is pessimistic about reversing such disequalizing effect as "far too huge 
to be politically feasible". 
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Wong (2006) argues that the biggest distortion for the current 
intergovernmental transfer system is the wage adjustment scheme which 
amounts to the central government injecting funds to fend off wage arrears so 
as to ensure social stability. Furthermore, the nationally unified civil service 
scale for basic wages may induce local governments to hire more staff, 
creating a bloated bureaucracy. 
Ahmad, Singh and Fortuna (2004) also criticize that, though the current 
transfer system to a certain extent help to narrow the fiscal gap, it does not 
adequately allocate transfers to all local governments so that they can have a 
minimum public services provision. Other than the lack of sufficient transfers, 
the bloated bureaucracy is also another cause for the underprovision of public 
services. As argued by Li (2004) and Zhong (2006), some transfers used for 
the provision of public services are diverted to feed the fiscally supported 
population so as to maintain political stability. 
To ensure equitable public service provision across jurisdictions, Liu and 
Tao (2004) argue that more equalizing transfers are necessary. However, they 
point out that as there is a lack of government accountability to the local 
population, increased transfers from the central government cannot guarantee 
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better public service provision. 
On the whole, the current design of China's intergovernmental transfer 
system is often criticized as not being need-based. Instead, it is often argued 
that to maintain political stability is the motivation behind the central 
government to introduce various categories of intergovernmental transfers. In 
the previous section, we discuss possible political variables as proxies for 
political effects driving the spatial allocation of intergovernmental transfers. In 
China, a country without a democratic system, such effect may come from the 
huge fiscally supported population. Recall that in previous chapter, we review 
how the huge fiscally supported population may be an important factor behind 
the local fiscal crisis. 
While the existing literature is full of studies based on ad hoc theorizing, 
anecdotes and case studies, there are very few empirical studies focusing on 
the political economy shaping the intergovernmental transfer systems in China, 
the exceptions being and Wang (2005) and Shih, Liu and Zhang (2004). By 
employing a panel dataset of provincial-level data, Wang (2005) investigate 
empirically the determinants behind the spatial allocation of transfers at the 
provincial level. He finds out that central transfers allocated to the provinces 
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are politically motivated. In his words, the central government "tends to use 
fiscal transfers to please their constituents or to neutralize potential threats". 
As this study focuses only on the provincial-level, it is not sure whether 
his results also apply to the system of transfers at the subprovincial level. 
Based on a cross section of county-level data, Shih, Liu and Zhang (2004) 
focus on earmarked transfers and find out that the fiscally supported 
population may be an important political factor behind the spatial allocation of 
earmarked transfers. However, their estimations are based on cross-section 
data and thus fail to control for county-specific effects. 
There is thus much room to extend the empirical works of Wang (2005) 
and Shih, Liu and Zhang (2004). In particular, we try to improve upon their 
estimation by employing a new panel dataset of county-level data. 
Furthermore, we focus on four categories of transfers, namely, earmarked 
transfers, tax rebates, transitional intergovernmental transfers and wage 
adjustment transfers. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the literature on the purposes 
and the common practice for intergovernmental transfers. Based on this 
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traditional theory, the allocation of transfers should depend on such factors as 
income and local needs so as to correct vertical imbalances and address the 
equalization of public services and regional disparities. However, in the 
Chinese context, the system of transfers is often criticized as not following this 
practice and is often distorted by political considerations. In democratic 
countries, such political distortions are often induced by incentives of the 
system of political representation. Empirical studies often resort to different 
proxies to capture those dimensions of the political system relevant to the 
allocation of transfers. However, without an electoral system, such an 
approach cannot be applied to China without taking into account her political 
system. Thus, different proxies for political considerations such as fiscally 
supported population have to be invoked. Our review of the literature suggests 
that there are very few papers studying rigorously the political economy of 
China's intergovernmental transfer system and there is much room for this 
thesis to build on the existing literature. 
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Chapter Four 
Model Specification, Data and Empirical Strategy 
This thesis attempts to explore statistically the determinants behind the 
spatial allocation of transfers with special emphasis on its political economy 
using a panel dataset. A regression framework is adopted. We first present our 
model specification and discuss the set of independent variables included in 
our regression analysis. Then we present the data employed. Equipped with 
this, we discuss three commonly used panel data models in detail. 
4.1 Basic Specification 
Maintaining political stability is of utmost concern to the central 
leadership. In this connection, they have introduced various categories of 
transfers as described in chapter two. To investigate empirically to what extent 
the current county-level intergovernmental transfer systems are shaped by 
politics as opposed to equalization of public services and regional disparities, 
we regress various categories of transfers on a set of explanatory variables. 
Because of China's spatial diversities, we also try to find out whether the 
determinants with respect to the allocation of transfers vary across regions. 
We set up the following regression model: 
4 0 
(1) 
where i and t denote the county/county-level city and 产 time period, 
K denotes the number of explanatory variables, Y., denotes various 
categories of transfers, X他 denotes the set of independent variables, 
denotes the coefficients to be estimated and s.^  denotes idiosyncratic error 
such that it is homoskedastic and serially uncorrelated, i.e., 
E{£]e^ I X.,, c,.) = E(s:;£)) . Details for the definition of variables are shown in 
Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent REARPC Real earmarked transfers (zhuanxiang buzhu) per lOOOOYuan/Person 
Variable capita 
RREBPC Real tax rebates {suodeshui jishufanhuan) per capita 10000Yuan/Person 
RTRAPC Real transitional intergovernmental transfers 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
(guoduqi caizheng zhuanyi zhifu buzhu) per capita 
RWAGPC Real wage adjustment transfers {tiaozheng gongzi 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
zhuanyi zhifu buzhu) per capita 
Independent EASTERN* Interaction term of the dummy variable EASTERN and 
Variable FSPC fiscally supported population per capita 
EASTERN =1 if the county/county-level city is in the Ratio 
eastern region; otherwise, 0 
CENTRAL* Interaction term of the dummy variable CENTRAL and Ratio 
FSPC fiscally supported population per capita 
Politics CENTRAL =1 if the county/county-level city is in the 
central region; otherwise, 0 
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WESTERN* Interaction term of the dummy variable WESTERN and Ratio 
FSPC fiscally supported population per capita 
WESTERN =1 if the county/county-level city is in the 
western region; otherwise, 0 
RACC Real accumulative fiscal balance per capita 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
Equalization RGDP Real gross domestic product per capita 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
Economic NARG Non-agricultural population to overall population Ratio 
structure 
Year-specific Y99 Y99=l if the year is 1999, otherwise 0. Dummy 
dummies 
YOO Y00=1 if the year is 2000, otherwise 0. Dummy 
YOl YO1=1 if the year is 2001，otherwise 0. Dummy 
^ Y02=l if the year is 2002, otherwise 0. Dummy 
Notes: 
1) The eastern, central and western regions are based on the official definition (Shah and Shen, 2006). 
2) 1999 is chosen as the base year. 
As shown in Table 4.1, our dependent variables include four categories 
of transfers (1) earmarked transfers, (2) tax rebates, (3) transitional 
intergovernmental transfers and (4) wage adjustment transfers. The set of 
independent variables can be grouped into two broad categories. 
(i) Political variables: they include the fiscally supported population 
{FSPC) and local fiscal deficit. Furthermore, to take into account China's 
spatial diversities, we set up the interaction terms between regional dummies 
and fiscally supported population per capita, namely, EASTERN*FSPC, 
CENTRAL*FSPC and WESTERmFSPC where EASTERN, CENTRAL and 
tt 
26 As mentioned in section 2.2, transitional intergovernmental transfers have been renamed as 
general-purpose transfers since 2002. Throughout the thesis, we refer this category of transfers 
as "transitional intergovernmental transfers" in the sample period. 
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WESTERN are regional dummies of the eastern, central and western regions. 
Each is assigned one if the county/county-level city is in the region, and zero, 
otherwise (See Table 1.1). Besides fiscally supported population, we also 
include real accumulated fiscal balance per capita (RACQ as a measure of 
local fiscal surplus (deficit if negative) with respect to each 
county/county-level city. 
(ii) Variables related to the equalization of public services and regional 
disparities include real gross domestic product per capita {RGDPPC) we are 
9Q 
interested to know whether the transfers are equalizing. 
Besides the above two categories, a set of controls is added. 
Non-agricultural population per capita {NARG) is included to capture the 
impact of economic structure on the spatial allocation of various categories of 
transfers. Year-specific dummies Y99-Y00 are included to capture year-specific 
effects. 
As discussed in section 2.2, the changing structure of the 
27 The baseline estimations without interaction terms for various categories of transfers are 
provided in Appendix II. Throughout this thesis, we mainly focus on the models with 
interaction terms in order to capture China's spatial diversities. Moreover, as fiscally 
supported population is our focal variable, we do not include interaction terms of other 
“ political variable, real accumulated fiscal balance per capita (RACC) in order to have a more 
parsimonious model specification. 
The ratio of ethnic minorities to the total population will be served as another political 
variable in the Hausman-Taylor model as discussed in section 4.3. 
29 Local needs such as illiteracy rate (ILL), infant mortality rate (MORT) and infant life 
expectancy (LIFE) will be included in the Hausman-Taylor model as shown in section 4.3. 
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intergovernmental transfer system suggests that factors shaping the allocation 
of transfers may also be changing. Thus, the expected signs for each 
independent variable may be different for each category of transfers. As a 
prelude for our subsequent empirical analysis, we take a closer look at the 
expected signs for independent variables in the four regression equations one 
by one as shown in Table 4.2. ‘ 
Table 4.2 Expected signs for independent variables ‘ 
EASTERN*FSPC CENTRAL*FSPC WESTERN*FSPC RACC RGDPC NARG 
REARPC Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant or Insignificant , 
even positive 
RREBPC Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Positive Positive 
RTRAPC Insignificant or Positive Positive Negative Negative Negative 
even negative 
RWAGPC Insignificant or Positive Positive Negative Negative Negative 
even negative 
Note: Details for the definition of variables can be found in Table 4.1 
(1) Earmarked transfers 
This category is made up of many transfers serving different purposes 
and thus hard to identify a priori which of the factors alluded to above are 
significant. Furthermore, these transfers are subjected to bargaining. This may 
even imply that richer jurisdictions are better positioned to get the transfers so 
that RGDPPC may be positively related to earmarked transfers. Though, Shih, 
Liu and Zhang (2004) show that fiscally supported population per capita is 
positively related to earmarked transfers per capita, their finding is far from 
conclusive not least because they fail to capture county-specific effect c. as 
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they employ cross-section county data in their study. 
(2) Tax rebates 
As discussed in section 2.2，tax rebates are mainly determined by the 
formulae laid by the 1994 reform to protect the vested interests of provincial 
governments. It is, however, not clear whether subprovincial governments 
follow this practice. If county-level governments follow the central-provincial 
arrangement, so that those with higher value-added taxes (VAT) are allocated 
with more transfers, then, the expected sign for RGDPPC is positive because 
VAT is positively correlated with GDP. As jurisdictions with a larger 
agricultural population have higher GDP, the expected sign for NARG is 
positive. In so far as tax rebates are mainly determined by formulae laid down 
by the tax-sharing agreement, the other right-hand-side variables may not be 
significant. But again, subprovincial variations with respect to tax rebates may 
be such that the allocation of tax rebates may be tied to some of the 
right-hand-side variables. 
(3) Transitional intergovernmental transfers 
Transitional intergovernmental transfers are the first formula-based 
transfers in China. If provincial governments follow the central-provincial 
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arrangement in designing their own formula-based systems with subordinate 
governments, we expect that such category of transfers is equalizing at the 
county level. More transfers will thus be allocated to poorer jurisdictions. As 
pointed out by Caizhengbu yusuansi (1999a), some subprovincial 
governments following the central-provincial arrangement incorporate fiscally 
supported population into the formulae that govern the allocation of 
transitional intergovernmental transfers. Thus, with regard to the political 
determinants, the expected signs for CENTRAL*FSPC and WESTERN*FSPC 
may be positive while that of EASTERN*FSPC may be insignificant or even 
negative. Relatively less well off than their eastern neighbours, the central and 
western regions may have to rely more on transfers to pay for the wages and 
subsidies for the fiscally supported population. On the contrary, the eastern 
region, being more developed, has enough fiscal resources and it may be less 
likely to rely on transfers. Since this category of transfers is explicitly 
designed to address the issue of budgetary shortfalls, it is not inconceivable 
that jurisdictions with higher fiscal deficits may be targets of this category of 
transfers so that RACC may have a negative sign. The same logic suggests that 
RGDPPC and NARG are expected to have negative signs. 
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(4) Wage adjustment transfers 
Wage adjustment transfers are used to alleviate the wage burdens in the 
comparatively poorer central and western regions. Therefore we expect that 
the coefficients of CENTRAL*FSPC and WESTERN*FSPC are positive. As 
the eastern region is a comparatively developed region, it has higher ability to 
generate enough resources for paying wages and subsidies to the fiscally 
supported population. Thus, the expected sign for EASTERN*FSPC may 
perhaps be insignificant or even negative. We further expect that more wage 
adjustment transfers will be allocated to jurisdictions with lower level of 
development so that the expected signs for RGDPPC, NARG and RACC are 
negative. 
4.2 Data 
The sample period under consideration is 1999-2003. Details for the 
sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1. The definitions of variables 
are reported in Table 4.1.The data used in this thesis mainly comes from 
1999-2003 Man Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng Tongji Ziliao (Sub-Provincial 
Public Finance Statistics, 1999-2003), published by the Ministry of Finance. 
This dataset includes a wide range of fiscal information, including fiscally 
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supported population and various categories of transfers received from 
upper-level governments for county-level jurisdictions. Owing to data 
limitations, our dataset covers budgetary data only. Non-budgetary funds are 
omitted in this thesis.)� 
Data for gross domestic product can be found in various provincial 
Statistical Yearbooks. Data for non-agricultural population & overall 
population can be found in various issues of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
fen Xianshi Renkou Tongji Ziliao 1999-2003 (Statistical Demographic 
Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Nationwide, 1999-2003). The 
data for population are based on household registration {huji renkou) but not 
permanent residents (changzhu renkou)” For prefecture-level cities such as 
Shenzhen and Tongguan, population based on household registration may 
sometimes differ greatly from population based on permanent residents. As 
our thesis only focuses on county-level governments, these outliers are not 
included in our sample. Though such data limitations are not so serious in our 
case, we still try to deal with this by constructing a data series of permanent 
‘， residents for each county/county-level city. In the subsequent analysis, we 
30 See Wong (1997) and Zhou (2006) for the discussion on non-budgetary funds. Examples of 
non-budgetary funds include illegal fees and levies collected by local governments. 
31 See section 5.2.1 for a detailed discussion of the data problems. 
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have tried to do our estimations by using both population based on household 
registration and the constructed population series which is based on permanent 
residents. It turns out that the estimation results are hardly different. Thus, we 
will use the population data based on household registration in our empirical 
analysis. 
We follow Shih, Liu and Zhang (2004) by eliminating all county-level 
districts {qu) because the data for districts such as gross domestic product do 
not exist. Besides, we exclude them in our analysis because there are frequent 
jurisdictional changes with respect to county-level districts. Also, for 
residential districts, the reported low GDP per capita will not be meaningful 
because of the limited economic activities there. Furthermore, we exclude 
counties from four directly administered cities, namely, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Chongqing because counties/county-level cities in these four 
directly administered cities are directly subordinate to them. However, 
counties/county-level cities in the provinces are subordinate to prefecture-level 
cities which lie between the provinces and counties/county-level cities. 
Besides, as there are very few counties/county-level cities in these four 
directly administered cities, excluding them from our analysis will not have 
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much influence on our estimations. 
Due to data limitations, we also exclude counties/county-level cities from 
Tibet Autonomous Region. Tibet Autonomous Region is a very special 
autonomous region in China. Excluding Tibet Autonomous Region may 
prevent the fiscal arrangement often unique to Tibet from possibly distorting 
our analysis of the mainstream arrangement. 
Jurisdictional changes may render data incomparable over time. We thus 
drop such observations. Altogether, we have data for 1865 counties. 
Combining the data for all these counties, we come up a panel data set. The 
summary statistics for all the variables are presented in Tables 4.3-4.7. Except 
for RTRAPC and RWAGPC with data starting from 2000，all the other series 
are available for the whole sample period 1999-2003. 
32 Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing has three, four and five directly administered counties, 
respectively. Chongqing has twenty-two directly administered counties and four directly 
administered county-level cities. 
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Table 4.3 Summary statistics for counties/county-level cities in 1999 
Variable Observations Mean Min Max Standard Deviation Unit 
REARPC 1865 0.0096 -0.0037 0.3793 0.0121 10000Yuan/Person 
RREBPC 1865 0.0073 -0.0009 0.5133 0.0194 10000Yuan/Person 
FSPC 1865 0.0310 0.0065 0.1661 0.0142 Ratio 
RGDPPC 1865 0.4682 0.0552 3.0218 0.3391 10000Yuan/Person 
NARG 1865 0.1719 0.0084 0.9807 0.1237 Ratio 
RACC 1865 -0.0003 -0.0712 0.0636 0.0067 10000Yuan/Person 
Table 4.4 Summary statistics for counties/county-level cities in 2000 
Variable Observations Mean Min Max Standard Deviation Unit 
REARPC 1865 0.0079 0 0.1836 0.0099 10000Yuan/Person 
RREBPC 1865 0.0072 -0.0013 0.4904 0.0185 10000Yuan/Person 
RTRAPC 1865 0.0025 -0.0016 0.1545 0.0067 10000Yuan/Person 
RWAGPC 1865 0.0028 0 0.1202 0.0057 lOOOOYuan/Person 
FSPC 1865 0.0319 0.0062 0.1589 0.0142 Ratio 
RGDPPC 1865 0.4914 0.0689 3.4503 0.3669 10000Yuan/Person 
NARG 1865 0.1765 0.0060 0.9968 0.1260 Ratio 
RACC 1865 -0.0003 -0.1136 0.0279 0.0074 10000Yuan/Person 
Table 4.5 Summary statistics for counties/county-level cities in 2001 
Variable Observations Mean Min Max Standard Deviation Unit 
REARPC 1865 0.0091 0 0.2133 0.0114 lOOOOYuan/Person 
RREBPC 1865 0.0072 -0.0012 0.5218 0.0190 10000Yuan/Person 
RTRAPC 1865 0.0035 -0.0016 0.1611 0.0085 10000Yuan/Person 
RWAGPC 1865 0.0075 0 0.2348 0.0129 10000Yuan/Person 
FSPC 1865 0.0324 0.0062 0.1762 0.0147 Ratio 
RGDPPC 1865 0.5219 0.0702 3.7926 0.3995 10000Yuan/Person 
NARG 1865 0.1792 0.0004 0.9979 0.1256 Ratio 
RACC 1865 0.0020 -0.1258 0.5467 0.0180 10000Yuan/Person 
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Table 4.6 Summary statistics for counties/county-level cities in 2002 
Variable Observations Mean Min Max Standard Deviation Unit 
REARPC 1865 0.0104 -0.0028 0.2037 0.0108 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
RREBPC 1865 0.0075 -0.0145 0.5387 0.0198 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
RTRAPC 1865 0.0047 -0.0015 0.2064 0.0116 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
RWAGPC 1865 0.0116 0 0.4827 0.0237 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
FSPC 1865 0.0327 0.0032 0.1727 0.0147 Ratio 
RGDPPC 1865 0.5759 0.0885 5.1006 0.4504 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
NARG 1865 0.1882 0.0085 0.9989 0.1290 Ratio 
RACC 1865 0.0005 -0.1339 0.0669 0.0091 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
Table 4.7 Summary statistics for counties/county-level cities in 2003 
Variable Observations Mean Min Max Standard Deviation Unit 
REARPC 1865 0.0111 0 0.1807 0.0110 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
RREBPC 1865 0.0075 -0.0008 0.5420 0.0199 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
RTRAPC 1865 0.0056 -0.0157 0.1837 0.0116 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
RWAGPC 1865 0.0118 0 0.4992 0.0245 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
FSPC 1865 0.0330 0.0068 0.1849 0.0147 Ratio 
RGDPPC 1865 0.6416 0.0736 6.6309 0.5244 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
NARG 1865 0.1958 0.0085 0.9988 0.1311 Ratio 
RACC 1865 0.0008 -0.1271 0.0810 0.0097 1 OOOOYuan/Person 
4.3 Panel Data Estimation 
Compared with previous studies often using cross-section data, our major 
advantage is that we have a panel data. This section first begins with the 
advantage of using panel data estimation. We then discuss the three commonly 
used panel data models in details, namely, simple pooling model, fixed-effect 
model and random-effect model. Finally, we discuss the Hausman-Taylor 
model. 
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Panel data have several advantages over cross-sectional or time-series 
data. For instance, Hsiao (2003) argues that panel data can increase the 
degrees of freedom and thus reduce the collinearity among explanatory 
variables. Particular useful to us is its ability to control the problem of fixed 
effects with the help of cross-section and time-series data. Let us recall 
equation (1) above. The unobserved county-specific effect c. may be 
correlated with some of the independent variables 女 . I f we run the 
regression based on ordinary least square regression, the estimates will be 
biased. However, with the presence of both cross-section and time-series data, 
we can eliminate the time-invariant unobserved effects c,. by transforming the 
variables. As shown below, we exploit the panel data set to control for the 
unobserved county/county-level-specific effect. 
Next, we review three models for panel data estimation: ^^  
Simple pooling model 
Simple pooling assumes homogeneous intercepts and slopes across 
observations (Hsiao, 1986), i.e., c, = c , / ? = /?,., meaning that there is no 
county-specific effect. Whether this assumption is valid turns out to be testable, 
“ S e e Hsiao (1986). 
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as we shall explain below. 
Fixed-effect model 
A fixed-effect model assumes heterogeneous intercepts with the same 
slopes across observations (See Woodridge, 2000). Consider equation (1). For 




where Y^  = T'^^Yj, . By subtracting (2) from (1) for each t, the unobserved 
t=\ 
effect c. can be removed prior and we estimate the following equation: 
k = \ 
The advantage of using a fixed-effect model is to get around the problem 
that there may be arbitrary correlation between c. and the explanatory 
variables. However, the fixed-effect model also has a major drawback. 
Time-invariant explanatory variables cannot be included because they will be 
eliminated together with the unobserved effect c. as a result of transforming 
the variables. 
Random-effect model 
If there is no such arbitrary correlation, it is inefficient if we use a 
fixed-effect model because we discard useful information from cross-sectional 
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variations. In this case, we should use the random-effect model instead of 
using the fixed-effect model. 
For a random-effect model, we have a composite random term 
represented as follows: 
w" = c,. + where f " � 卵 , c r ^ ) (4) 
Since the variance-covariance matrix for u“ is not a diagonal matrix, we 
need to employ generalized least square estimation for efficient estimation. 
The random-effect estimator, however, does not take into account correlation, 
if any, between c, and the explanatory variables Jf,•决.34 
After reviewing the three commonly used panel data models, we proceed 
to discuss how to select an appropriate model in practice. Hsiao (1986) 
presents the analysis-of-covariance method used for model selection. This 
method involves two steps as shown in Figure 4.1. 
34 Mundlak (1978) criticizes the random-effect model as it ignores the correlation that may 
exist between unobserved effect and observed explanatory variables. He points out that there 
are reasons to believe that such correlation exist in many circumstances. 
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Figure 4.1 Two-step procedure for choosing an appropriate panel data model 
Simple Pooling Model Vs Fixed-effect Model 
(F-test is used to test whether the intercepts are 
homogeneous i.e. ci=c) 
Fixed-effect Model Vs Random-effect Model 
Simple Pooling Model „ .广. , � � 
(Hausman specification test / Wald test is used to lest 
whether the unobserved effects Cj are correlated with Xju) 
；:i t 
Random-effect Model Fixed-effect Model 
In the first step，we employ an F-test to see whether the intercepts are 
c — c 
homogeneous across different counties/county-level cities, i.e. ' _ . In this 
test, the restricted model is the simple pooling model and the unrestricted 
model is the fixed-effect model. If the null hypothesis of homogeneous 
intercepts is not rejected, then the simple pooling method is preferred. If not, 
the fixed-effect model is preferred. 
However, the rejection of the null hypothesis only shows the intercepts 
are heterogeneous across different counties/county-level cities. Thus, we 
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should proceed to decide whether we should employ fixed-effect model or 
random-effect model in the second step. Hausman specification test or Wald 
test can be used as a formal check to help select the two models being^^ used. 
Arellano (1993，p.87) considers the Hausman specification test as a Wald test 
in an extended model which is estimated by Ordinary Least Square. As 
pointed out by Arellano (1993, p.87), Wald test is actually a "straightforward 
generalized test which is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
arbitrary forms" in contrast to a Hausman specification test which does not 
take into account heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary forms. ^^  
These tests can be regarded as tests for the correlation between the 
unobserved effects c,. and explanatory variables 式从.In both cases, the null 
hypothesis is that the random-effect model is the correct specification. If the 
random-effect model is the correct specification, then the estimator based on 
fixed-effect model is not efficient. On the other hand, if the unobserved effect 
is correlated with some of the explanatory variables, the resulted estimates 
35 The Hausman specification test is a conventional test to help select the fixed-effect model 
against the random-effect model. We can also consider a test of a fixed-effect model against 
random-effect model as a test of overidentifying restrictions. Recall that for a fixed-effect 
model, the orthogonality condition requires that explanatory variables are uncorrelated with 
the idiosyncratic error. However, for a random-effect model, the additional orthogonality 
condition requires that explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the composite random error. 
Unlike the Hausman specification test, this test extends straightforwardly to 
heteroskedastic-and cluster-robust versions. See Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002, pp. 
290-91). 
36 See Arellano (1993，p88-91) for a detailed mathematical derivation of the Wald test. 
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based on random-effect model will be biased. Thus, if the null hypothesis is 
rejected, the fixed-effect model should be chosen. Otherwise, the 
random-effect model is favored. 
Hausman-Taylor model 
One drawback of a fixed-effect model is that we cannot include 
time-invariant variables. On the contrary, the random-effect model allows us 
to include time-invariant variables. However, if there is arbitrary correlation 
between c,. and the explanatory variables X他 in any time period, the 
random-effect model will produce inconsistent estimators. Under this 
circumstance, one way to resolve the problem is to use the Hausman-Taylor 
model.37 The Hausman-Taylor model allows us to include time-invariant 
variables in which some of the explanatory variables are correlated with c.. 
Particular useful to us is that we can find out whether proxies for basic needs 
such as ethnic minorities, illiteracy rate, infant mortality rate, infant life 
expectancy, etc, are important time-invariant determinant behind the spatial 
allocation of various categories of transfers. However, its major drawback is 
37 See Hausman and Taylor (1981) for a detailed mathematical derivation of the 
Hausman-Taylor Model. The all or nothing choice of correlation between c/ and the 
explanatory variables in the fixed-effect and random-effect model prompted Hausman and 
Taylor (1981) to propose a model where some of the explanatory variables are correlated with 
Ci. 
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that we need to specify which explanatory variables X油 are uncorrelated 
with c, prior to the estimations. 
Concluding Remarks 
Regarding the political economy of the intergovernmental transfer system 
in China, previous studies often use cross-section data which fails to capture 
the county-specific effect. Our thesis attempts to resolve this by employing a 
panel data set. In this connection, three commonly used panel data models and 
the Hausman-Taylor models are reviewed in this chapter. Equipped with these, 
we proceed to empirical estimations in the next chapter. 
38 Arellano (2003) argues that the using of Hausman-Taylor model is limited in applied 
studies because it is difficult to convincingly specify which explanatory variables are 




This chapter begins with the two steps outlined in the previous chapter 
for selecting an appropriate model for our estimations. We then discuss the 
estimation results for the various categories of transfers. These empirical 
results may not only shed light on the implications regarding the changing 
structure of the transfer system, but may also show whether politics or equity 
considerations are more important in the current transfer system. 
5.1 Selection of Panel Data Model 
Following the analysis-of-covariance method (Hsiao, 1986)，we first 
employ an F-test to test whether the intercept term in equation (1) is 
heterogeneous. As shown in Table 5.1, for all categories of transfers, the F-test 
rejects the hypothesis c. = c. The fixed-effect model is thus preferred to the 
simple pooling model and the intercepts are heterogeneous. Thus, we proceed 
to the second step to see whether a fixed-effect model or a random-effect 
model should be chosen. As reported in Table 5.2, both the Wald test and 
Hausman specification test show that there are strong evidences suggesting 
that a fixed-effect model should be preferred for all categories of transfers. 
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Thus, we will mainly focus on the fixed-effect model in our subsequent 
analysis. Finally, we use the LM test to test for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. The results reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
Thus, robust t-statistics will be used in the estimations. 
Table 5.1 Test ing for the existence of unobserved county-speci f ic effects 
Model (1) ^ (4) 
REARPC RREBPC RTRAPC RWAGPC 
Simple Pooling Model vs Fixed-effect Model 
Test for significance of fixed-effed 12.39 227.97 15.24 10.02 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Selection of Model Fixed-effect Model Fixed-effect Model Fixed-effect Model Fixed-effect Model 
Notes: 
1) REARPC: Real earmarked transfers per capita 
2) RREBPC: Real tax rebates per capita 
3) RTRAPC: Real transitional intergovernmental transfers per capita 
4) RWAGPC: Real wage adjustment transfers per capita 
Table 5.2 Select ion of panel data model 
Model OJ (2) ^ (4) 
REARPC RREBPC RTRAPC RWAGPC 
Fixed-effect Model vs Random-effect Model 
H a u s m a n Speci f icat ion Tes t 157.73 99.87 89.97 92.51 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Wald Test 132.27 82.55 39.68 49.56 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Selection of Model Fixed-effect Model Fixed-effect Model Fixed-effect Model Fixed-effect Model 
Notes: 
1) REARPC: Real earmarked transfers per capita 
2) RREBPC: Real tax rebates per capita 
3) RTRAPC: Real transitional intergovernmental transfers per capita 
4) RWAGPC: Real wage adjustment transfers per capita 
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5.1.1 Estimation Results for Real Earmarked Transfers Per Capita 
(REARPC) 
To study the political economy of the current county-level 
intergovernmental transfer system, we regress various categories of transfers 
against a set of explanatory variables. Table 5.3 shows the estimation results 
for real earmarked transfers per capita using simple pooling model, 
fixed-effect model and random-effect model. As there are strong evidences 
suggesting that fixed-effect model should be preferred, we only focus on the 
estimation results for the fixed-effect model in our analysis below. 
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Table 5.3 Estimation results for real earmarked transfers per capita for the sample period 1999-2003 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Simple Pooling Fixed-effect Random-effect 
REARPC REARPC REARPC 
EASTERNTSPC 0.41429*** -0.16042*** 0.26234*** 
(14.15) (3.13) (7.18) 
CENTRALTSPC 0.37259*** 0.06141* 0.25410*** 
(13.68) (1.88) (9.15) 
WESTERNTSPC 0.45482*** -0.01316 0.34764*** 
(14.43) (0.14) (10.55) 
RGDPPC -0.00144*** -0.00054 -0.00093* 
(3.86) (0.39) (1.94) 
RACC 0.10602** 0.00154 0.01807 
(2.15) (0.08) (0.71) 
NARG 0.00220*** -0.00297 0.00289* 
(2.62) (1.49) (1.87) 
Y99 -0.00069** -0.00165*** -0.00093*** 
(1.98) (5.96) (4.40) 
YOO -0.00271*** -0.00331*** -0.00286*** 
(9.76) (12.59) (19.22) 
Y01 -0.00190*** -0.00206*** -0.00181*** 
(6.51) (8.97) (10.99) 
Y02 -0.00054** -0.00073*** -0.00058*** 
(1.97) (4.42) (3.91) 
Constant -0.00245** 0.01281*** 0.00115 
(2.25) (5.77) (1.16) 
Observations 9325 9325 9325 
Number of groups 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.3748 0.06 0.36 
LM heteroscedasticity 811.751 1595.58 596.607 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for significance of fixed-effecl 12.39 
p-value [0.0000] 
Hausman Specification Test 157.73 
p-value [0.0000] 
Wald Test 132.27 
p-value [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
2) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
3) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
As shown in column 2，all variables except EASTERN*FSPC and 
CENTRAL*FSPC are insignificant. The coefficient of EASTERN*FSPC is 
negatively significant at the 1% level. CENTRAL*FSPC is marginally 
significant. Let us recall that earmarked transfers are mainly subjected to 
bargaining. It is not surprising many of the right-hand-side variables, including 
RGDPPC, RACC and NARG are insignificant. The ad hoc outcome of the 
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bargaining process may have no relationship with many of our right-hand-side 
variables. ^^  
The coefficient of EASTERN*FSPC is negatively significant, suggesting 
that county-level governments with more fiscally supported population are 
allocated with fewer transfers in the eastern region. Perhaps, as earmarked 
transfers are composed of many categories of transfers ranging from capital 
constructions to social relief for calamities, composition of earmarked 
transfers may be different for the eastern region. Another possible explanation 
is that the eastern region, being a wealthier region, has sufficient fiscal 
resources to feed the fiscally supported population. 4® Thus, the eastern region 
does not need to rely so much on the upper-level governments for paying 
wages. 
5.1.2 Estimation Results for Real Tax Rebates Per Capita (RREBPC) 
In this sub-section, we take a closer look at the estimation results for tax 
39 Though the coefficients of the year dummies are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
their magnitudes seem to be so small such that they are economically insignificant where the 
statistical significance of a variable is governed by the size of its t-statistic and the economic 
significance of a variable is determined by the size (and sign) of its estimated coefficient. 
However, we find out that the small magnitudes of the coefficients associated with the year 
,, dummies are related to our units of measurement for the variables. Besides, as the year 
dummies are not our focal variables, we do not focus on this issue in this thesis. 
Also, local governments in the eastern region are able to collect non-budgetary revenues 
through proceeds from land conversion activities, i.e. turning agricultural land into 
non-agricultural land (Lin and Ho, 2005; Zhou, 2006a). I thank the external examiner for 
suggesting such a possibility. 
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rebates. As the original intention for tax rebates is to appease affluent local 
governments, the primary beneficiaries of this system are wealthy jurisdictions 
instead of poor underdeveloped jurisdictions. Thus the allocation of tax 
rebates is not expected to conform to the equity principle at the subprovincial 
level. The estimation results for real tax rebates per capita are shown in Table 
5.4. Again, we only focus on the fixed-effect model because both the Wald test 
and Hausman specification test suggest that a fixed-effect model is preferred. 
65 
Table 5.4 Estimation results for real tax rebates per capita for the sample period 1999-2003 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Simple Pooling Fixed-effect Random-effect 
RREBPC RREBPC RREBPC 
EASTERNTSPC 0.14549*** 0.01393 0.06530* 
(2.99) (0.52) (1.84) 
CENTRALTSPC 0.10469*** -0.02114 0.01023 
(3.75) (0.44) (0.52) 
WESTERNTSPC 0.12662*** 0.03550*** 0.03561*** 
(4.49) (2.76) (2.93) 
RGDPPC 0.00719*** 0.00382*** 0.00429*** 
(11.65) (11.54) (10.18) 
RACC 0.39070*** -0.0023 0.00178 
(4.66) (0.22) (0.10) 
NARG 0.01247"* 0.00172 0.00371** 
(6.03) (1.39) (1.99) 
Y99 0.00200*** 0.00051*** 0.00069*** 
(3.24) (4.25) (5.14) 
YOO 0.00158*** 0.00030*** 0.00045*** 
(2.61) (3.88). (5.40) 
Y01 0.00045 0.00025*** 0.00035*** 
(0.86) (3.84) (5.01) 
Y02 0.00073 0.00027*** 0.00032*** 
(1.16) (3.69) (3.86) 
Constant -0.00402*** 0.00423*** 0.00283*** 
(7.29) (4.95) 
Observations 9325 9325 9325 
Number of groups 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.1091 0.0232 0.06 
LM heteroscedasticity 37.8781 19.4759 20.9446 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for significance of fixed-effecl 227.97 
p-value [0.0000] 
Hausman Specification Test 99.87 
p-value [0.0000] 
Wald Test 82.55 
p-value [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
2) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
3) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
As reported in column 2 of Table 5.4, the coefficient associated with 
RGDPPC is positively significant at the 1% level. This suggests that 
county-level governments with higher GDP per capita receive more transfers. 
There is thus strong evidence that the spatial allocation of tax rebates is indeed 
biased towards wealthy jurisdictions at the subprovincial level and is not 
66 
e q u a l i z i n g . 4 1 RACC and NARG are insignificant because tax rebates are 
mainly determined by formulae laid down by the tax-sharing agreement. 
The coefficient of WESTERN*FSPC is positively significant at the 1% 
level while that of the EASTERN*FSPC and CENTRAL*FSPC are 
insignificant. This may suggest that, unlike the central-provincial allocation of 
RREBPC which is mainly determined by the formulae laid by the 1994 reform 
(Song, 2006; Wang, 2002), the actual county-level allocation of RREBPC in 
the western region is significantly related to the size of the bureaucracy. This 
finding is a piece of evidence suggesting that there may be regional variations 
with respect to the implementation of the tax sharing system. The principles 
and formulae laid down for the central-provincial arrangement may not be 
strictly adhered to at the subprovincial level. 
5.1.3 Estimation Results for Real Transitional Intergovernmental 
Transfer Per Capita (RTRAPC) 
The estimation results for real transitional intergovernmental transfers per 
capita are shown in Table 5.5. As before, we only focus on the fixed-effect 
model in our subsequent analysis because both the Wald test and Hausman 
41 Many Chinese scholars argue that the tax rebates are regressive. Upper-level governments 
should add a redistributive component to it. It is arguable whether tax rebates may be 
considered "regressive" because counties with larger submissions of VAT and consumption 
tax receive more tax rebates according to the formulae laid down by the central government. 
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specification test suggest that a fixed-effect model should be preferred. 
Table 5.5 Estimation results for real transitional intergovernmental tranfsers per capita 
for the sample period 2000-2003 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Simple Pooling Fixed-effect Random-effect 
RTRAPC RTRAPC RTRAPC 
EASTERNTSPC 0.25868*** 0.04482 0.21667*** 
(10.42) (0.96) (6.71) 
CENTRALTSPC 0.17005*** 0.02408 0.14537"* 
(7.81) (0.89) (5.81) 
WESTERNTSPC 0.24151*** 0.14131"* 0.21642*" 
(10.28) (4.58) (8.26) 
RGDPPC -0.00392*** -0.00278*** -0.00301*** 
(9.28) (4.76) (6.01) 
RACC 0.08545* -0.0135 0.00109 
(1.78) (0.78) (0.03) 
NARG 0.00808*** -0.00545*** 0.00374* 
(4.22) (3.49) (1.92) 
YOO -0.00315*** -0.00352*** -0.00322*** 
(10.56) (17.63) (19.28) 
Y01 -0.00242*** -0.00249*** -0.00230*** 
(8.07) (16.76) (15.46) 
Y02 -0.00100*** -0.00112*** -0.00101*** 
(2.85) (8.25) (6.02) 
Constant -0.00096 0.00567*** 0.00033 
(1.21) (6.64) (0.37) 
Observations 7460 7460 
Number of groups 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.1813 0.1007 0.17 
LM heteroscedasticity 138.668 790.942 573.688 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for significance of fixed-effecl 15.24 
p-value [0.0000] 
Hausman Specification Test 89.97 
p-value [0.0000] 
Wald Test 39.68 
p-value [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
2) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
3) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
The coefficient of WESTERN*FSPC is positively significant at the 1% 
level. Recall that county-level governments have the discretion to design their 
own formula-based system. These findings may suggest that the subprovincial 
allocation of transitional intergovernmental transfers in the western region 
incorporate fiscally supported population into their formulae. This may be 
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possible given that the western region faces huge fiscal burdens and the 
problem of wage arrear is particularly serious. Thus, they have to depend on 
transfers to alleviate their fiscal plight (Zhou, 2006). It is not surprising that 
the coefficient of EASTERN*FSPC is insignificant because the eastern region 
is wealthier region which is capable of generating enough fiscal resources to 
pay wages and subsidies for the fiscally supported population. However, the 
coefficient of CENTRAL *FSPC is insignificant too, which is inconsistent with 
our expectation. This probably reflects that upper-level governments place 
more emphasis on helping the western region. 
The coefficient of RACC is insignificant. This is inconsistent with our 
expectation. On the other hand, since a rich jurisdiction with higher GDP per 
capita often faces a large non-agricultural sector, it is not surprising that the 
coefficients of RGDPPC and NARG are negatively significant at the 1% level. 
Comparing with the results for earmarked transfers and tax rebates, the most 
notable difference is that transitional intergovernmental transfers at the county 
level are equalizing. The subprovincial allocation of transitional 
intergovernmental transfers is in line with the guiding principle undergirding 
the central-provincial system. 
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5.1.4 Estimation Results for Real Wage Adjustment Transfers Per Capita 
(RWAGPC) 
In recent years, local governments increasingly depend on wage 
adjustment transfers to alleviate their wage burdens. The central and western 
regions are comparatively poorer regions and thus we expect the coefficient of 
CENTRAL*FSPC and WESTERN*FSPC to be positively significant while that 
of EASTERN*FSPC to be insignificant. The estimation results for real wage 
adjustment transfers per capita are shown in Table 5.6. Again we only focus on 
the fixed-effect model. 
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Table 5.6 Estimation results for real wage adjustment per capita for the sample period 2000-2003 
Model Q) (2) ^ 
Simple Pooling Fixed-effect Random-effect 
RWAGPC RWAGPC RWAGPC 
EASTERNTSPC 0.19732"* -0.27280** 0.13405* 
(4.29) (2.50) (1.85) 
CENTRAL*FSPC 0.26893*** -0.22702*** 0.22814*** 
(6.43) (2.71) (3.43) 
WESTERN*FSPC 0.41689*** 0.25030** 0.37047*** 
(8.96) (2.38) (5.02) 
RGDPPC -0.00277*** 0.00033 -0.00084 
(4.44) (0.16) (0.75) 
RACC 0.18565*** -0.1421 -0.07004 
(3.53) (1.14) (0.89) 
NARG 0.01404*** -0.01242*** 0.00751** 
(4.99) (3.13) (2.12) 
YOO -0.00862*** -0.00947*** -0.00879*** 
(16.18) (20.63) (24.98) 
Y01 -0.00443*** -0.00436*** -0.00404*** 
(7.89) (13.56) (13.03) 
Y02 -0.00016 -0.00041 -0.00019 
(0.23) (1.36) (0.47) 
Constant 0.00007 0.01458*** 0.00193 
(0.05) (5.15) (0.74) 
Observations 7460 7460 
Number of groups 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.2015 0.1867 0.17 
LM heteroscedasticity 33.8276 4698.7 212.665 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for significance of fixed-effed 10.02 
p-value [0.0000] 
Hausman Specification Test 92.51 
p-value [0.0000] 
Wald Test 49.56 
p-value [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
2) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
3) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
As shown in column 2 of Table 5.6，the coefficient of EASTERN*FSPC 
and CENTRAL*FSPC are negatively significant at the 1 % level and the 5% 
level, respectively. Similar to the estimation results for earmarked transfers, as 
the eastern region is a wealthier region that has sufficient fiscal resources 
obtained from non-budgetary revenues to support the fiscally supported 
population beyond the transfers allocated by the upper-level governments. 
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However, it is not clear why local governments in the underdeveloped central 
region receive fewer transfers with a larger fiscally supported population. 
Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient of WESTERN*FSPC is 
positively significantly at 5% level. These findings show that the allocation of 
wage adjustment transfers is biased towards the western region instead of the 
central region. 
The coefficient of NARG is negatively significant at the 1% level. In so 
far as NARG may be thought of as one indicator of the level of economic 
development, this may suggest that the allocation of this transfer is biased in 
favour of less developed jurisdictions. However, all the other explanatory 
variables including / ^ C C and RGDPPC are insignificant. 
5.2 Problems with Estimation & Robustness of Results 
5.2.1 Data problems & Robustness 
There is much concern in recent years about the quality of China statistics. 
A discussion of the data problem is thus warranted. Our concern pertains to the 
population data. Our data for population comes from Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo fen Xianshi Renkou Tongji Ziliao 1999-2003 {Statistical 
\\ 
Demographic Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Nationwide 
1999-2003) and is based on household registration (huji renkou). This data 
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limitation may overestimate or underestimate the number of permanent 
residents (changzhu renkou) within jurisdictions. 
To find out how robust our results are with respect to this potential 
problem, we try to construct a data series for the number of permanent 
residents in each county/county-level city for the sample period. First, we 
calculate a ratio of total population based on permanent residents to total 
population based on household registration for each county/county-level city 
as shown below: 
TT 
Ratio = L (5) 
TL, 
where TLp is the total population based on permanent residents and is 
the total population based on household registration. Both series are obtained 
from 2000 Nian Renkou Pucha fen Xian Zilao (National Population Census 
2000) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2003). 
Assuming that this ratio for each county/county-level city is roughly the 
same within the sample period 1999-2003, we construct a data series for 
permanent residents as follows: 
TLp, = Ratio x (6) 
where TLp* is the newly constructed total population based on permanent 
7 3 
residents and TP付* is the total population based on household registration 
obtained from Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo fen Xianshi Renkou Tongji Ziliao 
1999-2003 (Statistical Demographic Material for Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties Nationwide 1999-2003). 
Nest, we re-do the estimation described in the previous section with the 
newly constructed population data. 
Table 5.7 reports the estimation results for various categories of transfers 
using the modified population data. The estimates actually are hardly different 
from the previous estimation results. Our previous estimation results are 
robust to the modification of population data. These findings are not surprising 
because prefecture-level cities such as Shenzhen are excluded. 
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Table 5.7 Estimation Results for various categories of transfers using fixed-effect model 
(modified population data) 
Model (1) (2} (3} (4) 
REARPC RREBPC RTRAPC RWAGPC 
EASTERNTSPC -0.18292*** 0.01796 0.08967 -0.25119** 
(2.95) (0.70) (1.40) (2.49) 
CENTRALTSPC 0.05158 -0.01565 0.02154 -0.21088*** 
(1.63) (0.35) (0.81) (2.67) 
WESTERNTSPC 0.00376 0.03824*** 0.14059*** 0.24997*** 
(0.05) (2.84) (4.96) (2.83) 
RGDPPC -0.0002 0.00380*** -0.00327*** -0.00097 
(0.16) (12.07) (5.49) (0.46) 
RACC 0.00651 -0.00116 -0.0135 -0.13663 
(0.30) (0.11) (0.80) (1.12) 
NARG -0.00259 0.00133 -0.00507*** -0.01160*** 
(1.44) (1.12) (3.31) (2.97) 
Y99 -0.00162*** 0.00053*** 
(6.07) (4.30) 
YOO -0.00341*** 0.00033*** -0.00370*** -0.00972*** 
(13.92) (4.09) (18.37) (21.33) 
Y01 -0.00210*** 0.00027*** -0.00259*** -0.00450*** 
(9.69) (4.08) (17.18) (13.81) 
Y02 -0.00074*** 0.00028*** -0.00120*** -0.00048 
(4.51) (3.88) (8.89) (1.64) 
Constant 0.01289*** 0.00418*** 0.00574*** 0.01522*** 
(6.91) (7.38) (6.45) (5.70) 
Observations 9325 9325 7460 7460 
Number of groups 1865 1865 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.0649 0.0206 0.108 0.2 
LM heteroscedasticity 1603.45 19.39 867.35 4781.97 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) Sample period for Model 1 and Model 2 is 1999-2003 and that of Model 3 and Model 4 is 2000-2003. 
2) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
3) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
4) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
5) Population data based on usual residents for the sample period is constructed by using the ratio of total 
population based on usual residents to total population based on household registration which we obtain from 
2000 Nian Renkou Pucha fen Xian Zilao (National Population Census 2000). 
5.2.2 Different Sets of Explanatory Variables 
To further test the robustness of our specifications, we estimate all the 
models again by excluding the insignificant variables. The results are shown in 
Table 5.8. The estimates actually are hardly different from the previous 
estimation results. On the whole, our previous estimation results are robust to 
the exclusion of the insignificant variables. 
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Table 5.8 Estimation results for various categories of transfers using fixed-effect model 
(excluding insignifcant variables) 
Model (1) [2} (4) 
REARPC RREBPC RTRAPC RWAGPC 
EASTERNTFSPC -0.16960*** 0.01585 0.04558 -0.26521** 
(3.42) (0.60) (0.98) (2.49) 
CENTRALTSPC 0.06236* -0.02089 0.02458 -0.22177*** 
(1.88) (0.43) (0.91) (2.67) 
WESTERNTSPC -0.0148 0.03568*** 0.14226*** 0.26027** 
(0.16) (2.77) (4.60) (2.44) 
RGDPPC 0.00386*** -0.00282*** 
(11.79) (4.80) 
NARG -0.00537"* -0.01156*** 
(3.45) (3.15) 
Y99 -0.00150*** 0.00048*** 
(8.07) (3.97) 
YOO -0.00317*** 0.00028*** -0.00351*** -0.00934*** 
(20.96) (3.58) (17.62) (23.80) 
Y01 -0.00195*** 0.00023*** -0.00251*** -0.00455*** 
(12.46) (3.26) (16.65) (17.15) 
Y02 -0.00068*** 0.00026*** -0.00112*** -0.00037 
(4.68) (3.55) (8.25) (1.27) 
Constant 0.01197*** 0.00452*** 0.00564*** 0.01425*** 
(7.62) (8.33) (6.64) (6.54) 
Observations 9325 9325 7460 7460 
Number of groups 1865 1865 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.0596 0.0229 0.1 0.1727 
LM heteroscedasticity 1602.19 19.35 822.61 5047.61 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) Sample period for Model 1 and Model 2 is 1999-2003 and that of Model 3 and Model 4 is 2000-2003. 
2) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
3) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
4) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
Recall that in the previous estimations as shown in Table 5.3-Table 5.6， 
the coefficient of WESTERN*FSPC is quite significant in all categories of 
transfers with the exception of REARPC. To further check the robustness of 
our focal variable FSPC for the western region, we employ a more 
parsimonious specification by including WESTERN^FSPC and 
NON-WESTERN*FSPC in our e s t i m a t i o n . 4 2 Table 5.9 reports the estimation 
results for various categories of transfers using two interactive terms only. 
Similar to the previous estimation results, the estimates hardly differ from the 




Table 5.9 Estimation results for various categories of transfers using fixed-effect model 
(two interactive terms only) 
Model Q j (2} (4) 
REARPC RREBPC RTRAPC RWAGPC 
~NON-WESTERN*FSPC -0.04292 -0.0043 0.03486 -0.24318*** 
(1.46) (0.15) (1.35) (3.43) 
WESTERNTSPC -0.01554 0.03574*** 0.14228*** 0.26020** 
(0.16) (2.78) (4.61) (2.44) 
RGDPPC 0.00389*** -0.00280*** 
(11.34) (4.80) 
NARG -0.00536*** -0.01158*** 
(3.46) (3.16) 
Y99 -0.00151*** 0.00048*** 
(8.16) (3.83) 
YOO -0.00318*** 0.00028*** -0.00351*** -0.00934*** 
(20.99) (3.61) (17.81) (23.86) 
Y01 -0.00194*** 0.00023*** -0.00251*** -0.00455*** 
(12.42) (3.27) (16.66) (17.14) 
Y02 -0.00066*** 0.00025*** -0.00112*** -0.00037 
(4.55) (3.54) (8.26) (1.26) 
Constant 0.01205*** 0.00449*** 0.00561*** 0.01429*** 
(7.71) (8.62) (6.52) (6.53) 
Observations 9325 9325 7460 7460 
Number of groups 1865 1865 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.0584 0.0228 0.1 0.1727 
LM heteroscedasticity 1605.00 19.42 822.61 5047.53 
p-value 『0.00001 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) Sample period for Model 1 and Model 2 is 1999-2003 and that of Model 3 and Model 4 is 2000-2003. 
2) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
3) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
4) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
5.2.3 Hausman-Taylor model: An Experiment 
We cannot include time-invariant variables in the fixed-effect model. If 
we are interested in incorporating time-invariant variables and unsure whether 
there is arbitrary correlation between c/ and the explanatory variables in any 
time period, one way to resolve the problem is to use the Hausman-Taylor 
m o d e l . 4 3 
Bearing this in mind, we experiment with the Hausman-Taylor method. 
43 The all or nothing choice of correlation between c/ and the explanatory variables in the 
f ixed-effect and random-effect model prompted Hausman and Taylor (1981) to propose a 
model where some of the explanatory variables are correlated with c/ 
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The results are thus tentative that we need to specify which explanatory 
variables X欣 are uncorrelated with c,. prior to the estimations. We include 
here some time-invariant variables, which may potentially be determinants 
behind the spatial allocation of various categories of transfers. The 
time-invariant variables include the ratio of ethnic minorities to total 
population {MIN), illiteracy rate {ILL), infant mortality rate (MORT) and infant 
life expectancy (JLIFE)*�MIN may serve as another proxy for political 
influence on the allocation of transfers. Upper-level governments may allocate 
more transfers to regions with large population of ethnic minorities so as to 
suppress secessionist tendencies. All other time-invariant variables are proxies 
for local needs. Including such variables into our regression helps us 
investigate whether the allocation of various categories of transfers take into 
account local needs. As the data for such variables is available for 2000 only 
and these variables only change very slowly, we assume that they are 
time-invariant. 
Recall that the major drawback for the Hausman-Taylor model is that we 
need to specify which explanatory variables are uncorrelated with c/ prior to 
44 The data for MIN and ILL can be obtained from National Population Census 2000 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2003). The data for MORT and LIFE are requested 
from Cai (2005). 
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the e s t i m a t i o n s . 45 We include some geography-related effects which are 
assumed to be exogenous. There may be a correlation between c/ and the 
economic structure for a county/county-level city which is represented by 
NARG. Thus, we specify NARG as the endogenous variable while all other 
time-varying variables are exogenous. The estimations are experimental in 
nature. Next, we employ the Hausman-Taylor model and estimate the four 
models again. As it is only an experiment, the estimation results reported in 
Table 5.10 are tentative. As shown in Table 5.10, with the exception of 
CENTRAL*FSPC in Model 2，the coefficients of the three interactive terms 
are positively significant in all models. Unlike the previous estimation results, 
FSPC also has a positive effect in both the eastern and central regions. On the 
whole, the response of FSPC in the western region is robust to the use of 
different estimation models while it is not robust in the eastern and central 
region. We should be cautious about these findings as we may incorrectly 
specify NARG as the only endogenous variable prior to the estimations. This is 
the major weakness of the Hausman-Taylor model used as an experiment and 
much remains to be done. 
Arellano (2003) argues that the using of Hausman-Taylor model is limited in applied 
studies because it is difficult to convincingly specify which explanatory variables are 
exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with c/ 
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With regard to the time-invariant factors, it is interesting to note that the 
coefficient of MIN is positively significant in Model 1，3 and 4，suggesting 
that the concern for secessionist tendencies plays an important role in the 
spatial allocation of these categories of transfers. This strongly indicates that 
upper-level governments try to appease ethnic minorities through allocating 
more transfers for the sake of political stability. 
The other time-invariant variables may be thought of as proxies for needs. 
As for ILL, the coefficient associated with it is positively significant in Model 
1 and Model 4，suggesting that more REARPC and RWAGPC will be allocated 
to counties/county-level cities with a higher illiteracy rate. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of MORT is insignificant in all models 
and that of LIFE is negatively significant in Model 1 only. Consistent with our 
expectation, the current subprovincial allocation of various categories of 
transfers is not quite related to local needs. Instead, politics seem to be the 
prominent driving force in the current system. 
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Table 5.10 Estimation Results for various categories of transfers using Hausman-Taylor model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
REARPC RREBPC RTRAPC RWAGPC 
EASTERN*FSPC 0.237340*** 0.061797" 0.218565"* 0.140324"* 
(9.98) (2.39) (9.57) (3.12) 
CENTRAL*FSPC 0.245525*" 0.008462 0.166032*" 0.281232*" 
(12.48) (0.38) (8.76) (7.49) 
WESTERNTSPC 0.258321*** 0.034814*** 0.217140"* 0.364069*" 
(18.27) (2.66) (15.47) (12.98) 
RGDPPC 0.00018 0.004272"* -0.002419*" 0.001215 
(0.40) (13.36) (5.48) (1.34) 
RACC 0.010498 0.001299 -0.000918 -0.088485"* 
(1.59) (0.34) (0.15) (6.54) 
NARG 0.004229** 0.002302* -0.004216* -0.011379" 
(1.96) (1.81) (1.96) (2.42) 
MIN 0.000030"* 0.000028 0.000035*" 0.000063"* 
(3.18) (1.56) (4.05) (3.82) 
ILL 0.000210*** -0.000058 0.000008 0.000095" 
(7.84) (1.10) (0.33) (2.01) 
MORT -0.015982 -0.030417 -0.010547 -0.029747 
(1.45) (1.37) (1.04) (1.54) 
LIFE -0.000416*** -0.000082 0.000148 0.000136 
(3.86) (0.39) (1.49) (0.71) 
Y99 -0.000802"* 0.000648*** 
(4.65) (5.98) 
YOO -0.002726*** 0.000418"* -0.003280*** -0.008829*** 
(16.27) (4.09) (21.73) (27.06) 
Y01 -0.001668*** 0.000331*" -0.002357"* -0.004070"* 
(10.22) (3.41) (16.10) (12.80) 
Y02 -0.000508"* 0.000314*** -0.001035"* -0.000193 
(3.24) (3.46) (7.41) (0.63) 
Constant 0.028943"* 0.010216 -0.009682 -0.007161 
(3.61) (0.65) (1.31) (0.51) 
Observations 9305 9305 7444 7444 
Number of groups 18^ 
Notes: 
1) Sample period for Model 1 and 2 is 1999-2003 and that of Model 3 and 4 is 2000-2003. 
2) Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
Concluding remarks 
This estimation results illustrate the changes in the factors shaping the 
allocations of transfers as a result of the changing structure of the transfer 
system. Throughout the 1990s, earmarked transfers remain an important 
component in the transfer system. Our estimation results for REARPC are 
consistent with the common perception that the allocation of earmarked 
transfers is a result of bargaining. The outcome may be haphazard and thus 
does not necessarily depend on the right-hand- side variables. After the 1994 
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reform, tax rebates and transitional intergovernmental transfers are introduced. 
We find out that RREBPC violates the equity principle and RTRAPC is the 
only equalizing transfer. As for wage adjustment transfers, our findings 
suggest that it is biased towards the western region only. Moreover, FSPC 
shows a positive effect in all categories of transfers except REARPC for the 
western region. Furthermore, the findings of the Hausman-Taylor model 
suggest that the current system is not quite related to local needs. On the 
whole, politics seems to be far more important than equity considerations in 
shaping the current transfer system. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we first summarize the salient findings which are 
important to the policy debate on county-level intergovernmental transfers 
systems. Next, we address the issue regarding the design of the county-level 
intergovernmental systems by drawing policy implications from our empirical 
findings. 
6.1 Summary of Salient Findings 
Many critics argue that China's current intergovernmental transfer system 
is distorted by political considerations. But very few studies have been 
devoted to studying empirically the political economy of the current transfer 
system. Our thesis fills this gap by investigating empirically the determinants 
behind the spatial allocation of various categories of transfers at the county 
level. 
Our results indicate that there are changing determinants governing the 
spatial allocation of various categories of transfers as a result of the changing 
structure of the transfer system. Earmarked transfers, an important component 
of the pre-1994 transfers, are mainly allocated on an ad hoc basis. Tax rebates, 
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one of the key components of the 1994 reform, are positively related to 
income level (GDP per capita) and the fiscally supported population in the 
western region. This category of transfers is thus not equalizing. The same is 
not true for the transitional intergovernmental transfer which is negatively 
related to the level of development and non-agricultural population, positively 
related to the fiscally supported population in the western region. Wage 
adjustment transfers, a newly introduced transfer in recent years, are positively 
related to the fiscally supported population in the western region. This 
suggests that the allocation of wage adjustment transfers is biased in favour of 
the poorer western region where the problem of wage arrears is more serious. 
Our results point out that among the four categories of transfers, transitional 
intergovernmental transfer is the only equalizing transfer under the current 
system. However, its amount is small as shown in Figure 2.2. 
The changing structure of the transfer system indicates that maintaining 
political stability has increasingly become a major concern to the central 
leadership not least because of the deterioration in the subprovincial fiscal 
crisis with wage arrears and mounting local fiscal deficits as symptoms. In so 
far as the local fiscal crisis is partly induced by an expanding bureaucracy, our 
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empirical results show that fiscally supported population is an important factor 
in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers especially for the western 
region, strongly suggesting that maintaining political stability shapes the 
spatial distribution of the new categories of transfers. The concern about 
political stability that underlies the current system is also evident in the 
estimation results of the Hausman-Taylor model. The allocation of many 
categories of transfers is also biased towards jurisdictions with higher 
proportions of ethnic minorities apparently to minimize secessionist 
tendencies. On the whole, equity considerations seem to play a limited role in 
the current system. Nor is the allocation of various categories of transfers 
related to local needs. Specifically, illiteracy rate, infant mortality rate and 
infant life expectancy as proxies for different needs are insignificant in 
shaping the allocation of transfers as suggested by our empirical results based 
on the estimation of the Hausman-Taylor model. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
Our empirical results provide evidences supporting the common 
perception that the current system is not quite equalizing. Instead, it is 
distorted by political considerations. A case in point is the close link between 
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the size of the fiscally supported population and the allocation of transfers. 
Rather than criteria based on local needs, the allocation of earmarked transfers 
is often the outcome of lobbying. Tax rebates are put in place to maintain the 
status quo. Thus, the current system of transfers has a number of deleterious 
effects. One of them is soft budget constraints. Subsidies helping to resolve or 
to prevent local fiscal crisis in order to maintain political stability are nothing 
short of bailouts. For example, based on our empirical findings, the allocation 
mechanism is often distorted by considerations to maintain political stability 
such as employment creation to avoid social unrest. Such a great reliance on 
upper-level governments for transfers to pay wages may easily lead to further 
expansion of the local bureaucracy (Liu and Tao, 2004). The resulting vicious 
cycle means that the effectiveness of the intergovernmental transfers will 
likely be adversely affected. 
Other than the perverse effect of bailing out local governments, China's 
subprovincial intergovernmental transfer system violates many principles for 
the design of an intergovernmental transfer system (See, e.g. Ahmad, Singh 
and Fortuna, 2004). The allocation of subprovincial earmarked transfers is 
often based on negotiation, lobbying and discretion exercised by higher-level 
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governments. The lack of a transparent set of rules to allocate transfers 
encourages unhealthy competition of transfers (Bahl, 1998). The end result is 
that jurisdictions with stronger ability to lobby receive more transfers instead 
of jurisdictions with greater fiscal needs. 
The current design of China's intergovernmental transfer system has 
prompted many fiscal experts to put forward proposals which are supposed to 
rectify the problems. Rather than tying the allocation of transfers to such 
variables as the size of bureaucracy, a common recommendation is that the 
central government should craft a need-based system (see, e.g., Shah and Shen, 
2006). Under this system, transfers are allocated to jurisdictions based on local 
needs as reflected by demographics such as school-age children, population 
above 60, etc. However, it is not certain whether crafting a need-based system 
is a realistic option. We need to understand the political economy behind the 
emergence of such a system of transfers in China. 
We argue that the changing configuration of China's transfer system is a 
result of leadership trying to use different categories of transfers to avert 
subprovincial fiscal crisis as reflected by symptoms like heavy wage burdens 
of the bloated bureaucracy. The subprovincial fiscal crisis has been a problem 
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plaguing poor local governments in China since the 1990s. The root cause for 
the persistent subprovincial fiscal crisis may be attributed to the top-down 
political system of China. Under the five-tier administrative hierarchy, 
upper-level governments control lower-level governments through a set of 
mandates under the target responsibility system {mubiao zerenzhi, TRS) (Tsui 
and Wang, 2004). Lower-level governments are assessed based on a set of 
qualitative and quantitative indicators, such as economic growth, birth control, 
etc.46 As many of these mandates are unfunded, local governments thus face a 
mismatch of expenditure responsibilities and revenue assignment, thereby 
creating huge fiscal burdens. Such huge fiscal burdens are probably 
destabilizing, prompting the central leadership to introduce different 
categories of transfers to maintain political stability. Without political reform 
of the top-down administrative hierarchy, the above logic implies that there are 
incentives to use ad hoc transfers to defuse local fiscal crises that are in no 
small measure attributable to the top-down political system. The existing 
political incentives are unlikely to steer the intergovernmental system towards 
the ideal design based on local needs. Only when local governments are free 
46 Political promotion and monetary reward/punishment are linked to the evaluations of 
whether the targets are met or not (Liu and Tao, 2004). 
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of the policy mandates cascading from above and the top-down political 
system reformed, can a better system of transfers be designed to provide both 




In this thesis, a panel dataset of 1865 counties/county-level cities for the 
period 1999-2003 is employed. All data are adjusted based on the 2003 
classification of administrative units in order to avoid data inconsistencies. 
Care is taken to ensure that they are intertemporally consistent. Otherwise, the 
observations are discarded. All nominal data are adjusted into real data by the 
use of provincial GDP d e f l a t o r s . 47 Population data based on household 
registration {huji renkou) are obtained from Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo fen 
Xianshi Renkou Tongji Ziliao 1999-2003 (中華人民共和國全國分縣市人口統計資 
料，1999-2003) (Statistical Demographic Material for Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties Nationwide, 1999-2003). The sources of the variables are reported as 
follows. 
Definition and source 
Earmarked transfers (zhuanxiang buzhu) 
Sources: 
Nominal data for earmarked transfers is obtained from 1999-2003 Nian Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng 
Tongji Ziliao (Sub-Provincial Public Finance Statistics, 1999-2003) 
Tax rebates (suodeshui jishufanhuan) 
Sources: 
Nominal data for tax rebates is obtained from 1999-2003 Nian Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng Tongji 
Ziliao (Sub-Provincial Public Finance Statistics. 1999-2003) 
Transitional intergovernmental transfers (guoduqi caizheng zhuanyi zhifu buzhu) 
Sources: 
Nominal data for transitional intergovernmental transfers is obtained from 1999-2003 Nian Quanguo 
Dishixian Caizheng Tongji Ziliao (Sub-Provincial Public Finance Statistics. 1999-2003 
,, Wage adjustment transfers (tiaozheng gongzi zhuanyi zhifu buzhu) 
47 The provincial GDP deflator is calculated by using the GDP growth index for each 
province which is available on CHINADATAONLINE. 
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Sources: 
Nominal data for wage adjustment transfers is obtained from 1999-2003 Nian Quanguo Dishixian 
Caizheng Tongji Ziliao (Sub-Provincial Public Finance Statistics, 1999-2003) 
Fiscally supported population (caizheng gongyang renkou) 
Sources: 
Fiscally supported population is obtained from 1999-2003 Nian Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng Tongji 
Ziliao (Sub-Provincial Public Finance Statistics. 1999-2003) 
Accumulated fiscal balance (guncun jieyu) 
Sources: 
Nominal data for accumulated fiscal balance is obtained from 1999-2003 Nian Quanguo Dishixian 
Caizheng Tongji Ziliao (Sub-Provincial Public Finance Statistics, 1999-2003) 
Non-agricultural population to overall population (feng nongye renkou) 
Sources: 
Non-agricultural population is obtained from Zhongguo fen Xianshi Renkou Tongji Ziliao 1999-2003 
(Statistical Demographic Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Nationwide, 1999-2003). 
Gross domestic product 
Sources: 
Nominal data for gross domestic product is obtained from various issues of Statistical Yearbooks, 
including 
• Anhui Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Anhui Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Fujian Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Fujian Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Gansu Nianjian 2000-2004 (Gansu Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Guangdong Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Guangxi Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Guangxi Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Guizhou Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Guizhou Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Hainan Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Hainan Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Hebei Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Hebei Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Heilongjiang Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Heilongjiang Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Henan Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Henan Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Hunan Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Hunan Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Inner Mongolia Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Inner Mongolia Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Jiangsu Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Jiangxi Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Jiangxi Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
“ • Jilin Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Jilin Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Liaoning Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Liaoning Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Ningxia Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Ningxia Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
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• Qinghai Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Qinghai Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Shangdong Nongcun Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Shangdong Agricultural Statistical Yearbook, 
2000-2004) 
• Shannxi Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Shannxi Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Shanxi Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Shanxi Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Sichuan Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Sichuan Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook. 2000-2004) 
• Yunnan Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Yunnan Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Zhejiang Tongji Nianjian 2000-2004 (Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004) 
• Zhongguo Xianshi Shehui Ziliao Gaiyao, 2000-2004 (Statistical Material for Sub provincial 
Social Information, 2000-2004) 
The ratio of ethnic minorities to total population 
Sources: 
2000 Nian Renkou Pucha fen Xian Zilao (National Population Census 2000) 
Illiteracy rate 
Sources: 
2000 Nian Renkou Pucha fen Xian Zilao (National Population Census 2000) 
Infant mortality rate 
Sources: 
Requested from Cai，Y. (2005).National, Provincial, Prefectural and County Life Tables for China Based 
in the 2000 Census. CSDE Working Paper, 05-03. 
Infant life expectancy 
Sources: 
Requested from Cai, Y. (2005), "National, Provincial, Prefectural and County Life Tables for China 
Based in the 2000 Census," CSDE Working Paper, 05-03. 
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Appendix II 
Table A1 Estimation results for real earmarked transfers per capita for the sample period 1999-2003 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Simple Pooling Fixed-effect Random-effect 
REARPC REARPC REARPC 
FSPC 0.45835*** -0.02083 0.34756*** 
(14.41) (0.32) (10.63) 
RGPPPC -0.00146*** -0.00069 -0.00138*** 
(4.12) (0.51) (3.17) 
RACC 0.09502** 0.00163 0.01515 
(2.12) (0.08) (0.64) 
NARG 0.00095 -0.00318 0.00221 
(1.14) (1.58) (1.46) 
Y99 -0.00065* -0.00169*** -0.00092*** 
(1.85) (5.40) (4.29) 
YOO -0.00269*** -0.00333*** -0.00287*** 
(9.67) (11.49) (19.37) 
Y01 -0.00188*** -0.00207*** -0.00183*** 
(6.41) (8.56) (11.23) 
Y02 -0.00054* -0.00072*** -0.00059*** 
(1.96) (4.18) (4.01) 
Constant -0.00341*** 0.01282*** 0.00001 
(2.99) (4.47) (0.01) 
Observations 9325 9325 9325 
Number of groups 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.3645 0.0589 0.36 
LM heteroscedasticity 682.147 1593.85 547.29 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for significance of fixed-effect 12.65 
p-value [0.0000] 
Hausman Specification Test 122.93 
p-value [0.0000] 
Wald Test 116.68 
p-value [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
2) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
3) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
9 3 
Table A2 Estimation results for real tax rebates per capita for the sample period 1999-2003 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Simple Pooling Fixed-effect Random-effect 
RREBPC RREBPC RREBPC 
FSPC 0.12431*** 0.02366* 0.03457*** 
(4.59) (1.91) (2.89) 
RGDPPC 0.00759*** 0.00384*** 0.00437*** 
(11.06) (11.13) (9.73) 
RACC 0.38918*** -0.00228 0.00175 
(4.66) (0.22) (0.10) 
NARG 0.01182*** 0.0017 0.00369** 
(5.69) (1.40) (1.98) 
Y99 0.00206*** 0.00054*** 0.00070*** 
(3.30) (3.93) (5.21) 
YOO 0.00162*** 0.00033*** 0.00046*** 
(2.67) (3.95) (5.47) 
Y01 0.00049 0.00026*** 0.00036*** 
(0.94) (3.97) (5.10) 
Y02 0.00075 0.00027*** 0.00033*** 
(1.19) (3.75) (3.86) 
Constant -0.00415*** 0.00389*** 0.00280*** 
(4.20) (8.14) (5.05) 
Observations 9325 9325 9325 
Number of groups 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.1086 0.0228 0.06 
LM heteroscedasticity 37.137 19.3926 15.7333 
P-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for significance of fixed-effecl 228.07 
P-value [0.0000] 
Hausman Specification Test 19.96 
P-value [0.0000] 
Wald Test 67.76 
P-value [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
2) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
3) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
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Table A3 Estimation results for real transitional intergovernmental tranfsers per capita 
for the sample period 2000-2003 
M ^ (1) (2) (3) 一 
Simple Pooling Fixed-effect Random-effect 
RTRAPC RTRAPC RTRAPC 
FSPC 0.23868*** 0.10500*** 0.21216*** 
(9.98) (4.61) (8.08) 
RGDPPC -0.00324*** -0.00283*** -0.00274*** 
(8.03) (4.83) (5.80) 
RACC 0.07976 -0.01354 -0.00011 
(1.60) (0.78) 0.00 
NARG 0.00648*** -0.00551"* 0.0029 
(3.51) (3.53) (1.53) 
YOO -0.00306*** -0.00349*** -0.00317*** 
(10.25) (17.71) (18.99) 
Y01 -0.00235*** -0.00248*** -0.00227*** 
(7.76) (16.71) (15.11) 
Y02 -0.00097*** -0.00111*** -0.00100*** 
(2.74) (8.20) (5.94) 
Constant -0.00155* 0.00503^* -0.00023 
(1.86) (5.42) (0.25) 
Observations 7460 
Number of groups 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.1679 0.1 0.16 
LM heteroscedasticity 126.486 792.274 542.452 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for significance of fixed-effecl 15.53 
p-value [0.0000] 
Hausman Specification Test 68.782 
p-value [0.0000] 
Wald Test 25.47 
p-value [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
2) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5 % & *** significant at 1%. 
3) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
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Table A4 Estimation results for real wage adjustment per capita for the sample period 2000-2003 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Simple Pooling Fixed-effect Random-effect 
RWAGPC RWAGPC RWAGPC 
FSPC 0.44053*** 0.08075 0.38563*** 
(9.30) (1.20) (5.15) 
RGDPPC -0.00474*** 0.00003 -0.00268** 
(7.35) (0.01) (2.41) 
RACC 0.16236*** -0.14228 -0.07755 
(2.77) (1.13) (0.96) 
NARG 0.01326*** -0.01276*** 0.00684* 
(4.77) (3.22) (1.94) 
YOO -0.00878*** -0.00932*** -0.00892*** 
(16.31) (20.27) (25.28) 
Y01 -0.00456*** -0.00430*** -0.00417*** 
(8.01) (13.22) (13.31) 
Y02 -0.00024 -0.00035 -0.00025 
(0.34) (1.16) (0.64) 
Constant -0.0024 0.01177*** -0.00045 
(1.49) (3.64) (0.17) 
Observations 7460 7460 
Number of groups 1865 1865 
R-squared 0.1822 0.1841 0.16 
LM heteroscedasticity 29.0738 4702.47 196.551 
P-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for significance of fixed-effecl 10.3 
p-value [0.0000] 
Hausman Specification Test 3297.3 
P-value [0.0000] 
Wald Test 32.71 
p-value [0.0000] 
Notes: 
1) As the LM test indicates there exists heteroscedasticity, robust t statistics are used in the estimations. 
2) Robust t statistics are in parentheses, in which * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% & *** significant at 1%. 
3) P-values for the diagnostic test are in square brackets. 
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